{"dataType":"CVE_RECORD","dataVersion":"5.2","cveMetadata":{"cveId":"CVE-2025-34500","assignerOrgId":"83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10","state":"PUBLISHED","assignerShortName":"VulnCheck","dateReserved":"2025-04-15T19:15:22.611Z","datePublished":"2025-10-24T23:02:29.851Z","dateUpdated":"2026-07-28T01:48:05.051Z"},"containers":{"cna":{"affected":[{"defaultStatus":"unknown","modules":["Update/decryption utility and package verification"],"product":"Deck Mate 2","vendor":"Light & Wonder, Inc. / SHFL Entertainment, Inc. / Shuffle Master, Inc.","versions":[{"lessThan":"all known versions prior to 2025-10-23","status":"affected","version":"0","versionType":"custom"}]}],"cpeApplicability":[{"nodes":[{"operator":"OR","negate":false,"cpeMatch":[{"vulnerable":true,"criteria":"cpe:2.3:a:british_airways:entertainment_system:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*","versionEndExcluding":"all"}]}]}],"credits":[{"lang":"en","type":"finder","value":"Joseph Tartaro of IOActive"},{"lang":"en","type":"finder","value":"Enrique Nissim of IOActive"},{"lang":"en","type":"finder","value":"Ethan Shackelford of IOActive"}],"descriptions":[{"lang":"en","supportingMedia":[{"base64":false,"type":"text/html","value":"Deck Mate 2's firmware update mechanism accepts packages without cryptographic signature verification, encrypts them with a single hard-coded AES key shared across devices, and uses a truncated HMAC for integrity validation. Attackers with access to the update interface - typically via the unit's USB update port - can craft or modify firmware packages to execute arbitrary code as root, allowing persistent compromise of the device's integrity and deck randomization process. Physical or on-premises access remains the most likely attack path, though network-exposed or telemetry-enabled deployments could theoretically allow remote exploitation if misconfigured. The vendor confirmed that firmware updates have been issued to correct these update-chain weaknesses and that USB update access has been disabled on affected units.<br>"}],"value":"Deck Mate 2's firmware update mechanism accepts packages without cryptographic signature verification, encrypts them with a single hard-coded AES key shared across devices, and uses a truncated HMAC for integrity validation. Attackers with access to the update interface - typically via the unit's USB update port - can craft or modify firmware packages to execute arbitrary code as root, allowing persistent compromise of the device's integrity and deck randomization process. Physical or on-premises access remains the most likely attack path, though network-exposed or telemetry-enabled deployments could theoretically allow remote exploitation if misconfigured. The vendor confirmed that firmware updates have been issued to correct these update-chain weaknesses and that USB update access has been disabled on affected units."}],"metrics":[{"cvssV4_0":{"Automatable":"NOT_DEFINED","Recovery":"NOT_DEFINED","Safety":"NOT_DEFINED","attackComplexity":"LOW","attackRequirements":"NONE","attackVector":"PHYSICAL","baseScore":7,"baseSeverity":"HIGH","privilegesRequired":"NONE","providerUrgency":"NOT_DEFINED","subAvailabilityImpact":"NONE","subConfidentialityImpact":"NONE","subIntegrityImpact":"NONE","userInteraction":"NONE","valueDensity":"NOT_DEFINED","vectorString":"CVSS:4.0/AV:P/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N","version":"4.0","vulnAvailabilityImpact":"HIGH","vulnConfidentialityImpact":"HIGH","vulnIntegrityImpact":"HIGH","vulnerabilityResponseEffort":"NOT_DEFINED"},"format":"CVSS","scenarios":[{"lang":"en","value":"GENERAL"}]}],"problemTypes":[{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-321","description":"CWE-321 Use of Hard-coded Cryptographic Key","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]},{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-327","description":"CWE-327 Use of a Broken or Risky Cryptographic Algorithm","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]},{"descriptions":[{"cweId":"CWE-347","description":"CWE-347 Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature","lang":"en","type":"CWE"}]}],"providerMetadata":{"orgId":"83251b91-4cc7-4094-a5c7-464a1b83ea10","shortName":"VulnCheck","dateUpdated":"2026-07-28T01:48:05.051Z"},"references":[{"tags":["technical-description","exploit"],"url":"https://www.ioactive.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/IOActive-card-shuffler-security.pdf"},{"tags":["media-coverage"],"url":"https://www.wired.com/story/card-shuffler-hack/"},{"tags":["media-coverage"],"url":"https://www.wired.com/story/how-hacked-card-shufflers-allegedly-enabled-a-mob-fueled-poker-scam-that-rocked-the-nba/"},{"tags":["third-party-advisory"],"url":"https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/shuffle-master-deck-mate-2-insecure-update-chain"}],"solutions":[{"lang":"en","supportingMedia":[{"base64":false,"type":"text/html","value":"<span style=\"background-color: rgb(255, 255, 255);\">Light &amp; Wonder reports that it has deployed firmware updates addressing the update-chain weaknesses IOActive described (including fixes to the cryptographic integrity checks) and has disabled the USB update port on affected Deck Mate 2 units.</span><br>"}],"value":"Light & Wonder reports that it has deployed firmware updates addressing the update-chain weaknesses IOActive described (including fixes to the cryptographic integrity checks) and has disabled the USB update port on affected Deck Mate 2 units."}],"source":{"discovery":"UNKNOWN"},"title":"Shuffle Master Deck Mate 2 Insecure Update Chain","x_generator":{"engine":"Vulnogram 0.4.0"}},"adp":[{"metrics":[{"other":{"type":"ssvc","content":{"timestamp":"2025-10-27T15:20:40.299784Z","id":"CVE-2025-34500","options":[{"Exploitation":"none"},{"Automatable":"no"},{"Technical Impact":"partial"}],"role":"CISA Coordinator","version":"2.0.3"}}}],"title":"CISA ADP Vulnrichment","providerMetadata":{"orgId":"134c704f-9b21-4f2e-91b3-4a467353bcc0","shortName":"CISA-ADP","dateUpdated":"2025-10-27T15:21:02.916Z"}}]}}