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GHSA-28f5-38xr-jh2w

java-client Allows Network Pivot via Unvalidated directConnect Redirect in AppiumCommandExecutor

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed) High CVE-2026-43910

Packages

EcosystemPackageAffectedFixed in
Maven io.appium:java-client >= 8.2.1, < 10.1.1 10.1.1

Details

As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).

## Summary When `directConnect(true)` is enabled, appium/java-client unconditionally accepts `directConnectHost`, `directConnectPort`, and `directConnectPath` from the server's NEW_SESSION response and silently redirects all subsequent session traffic to the attacker-specified endpoint — with no allowlist, no host validation, and no user notification. ## Affected Code - `AppiumCommandExecutor.java` (line 196–219): `setDirectConnect()` builds a new URL from server-supplied fields and calls `overrideServerUrl(newUrl)` without validating host/IP. - `DirectConnect.java`: `getUrl()` constructs `protocol://host:port/path` with no allowlist. ## Root Cause Only the protocol is validated (must equal "https"). The destination host and port are never checked against any allowlist or denylist. ## PoC (confirmed) A rogue server injecting `directConnectHost=127.0.0.1:4443` causes the client to silently redirect all post-session commands: [bootstrap] POST /wd/hub/session [bootstrap] Injecting directConnect -> https://127.0.0.1:4443/wd/hub [redirect-target] HIT #1: GET /wd/hub/session/poc-session-001/source [redirect-target] HIT #2: DELETE /wd/hub/session/poc-session-001 Original source code unmodified — confirmed via `git diff HEAD` (empty). ## Evidence Screenshots **Screenshot 1 — Rogue server capturing redirected traffic:** <img width="887" height="146" alt="1" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/cc28002c-ea20-4ac8-8336-cec632e3c842" /> **Screenshot 2 — Java client processing response from attacker host:** <img width="788" height="130" alt="2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/222cbab0-0d53-45b2-847d-6aa4e3b79370" /> ## Impact - Full interception of session traffic - Network pivot to internal hosts (RFC-1918, 169.254.169.254) - Cloud credential theft via IMDS endpoint - Escalates to ~8.1 High in CI/CD environments where directConnect(true) is set in shared base configuration ## Suggested Fix Add allowlist validation before `overrideServerUrl()` is called, and/or block RFC-1918/loopback/link-local destinations by default. [poc_appium_directconnect.zip](https://github.com/user-attachments/files/26472525/poc_appium_directconnect.zip)

References

External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.