GHSA-2hm2-hc3v-44h9
Mistune toc / TableOfContents directive: heading IDs use predictable `toc_N` numbering with no slugification, allowing collision with attacker-controlled `id="toc_N"` content
Packages
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
## Summary
**Type:** Predictable identifier generation. The `toc` plugin and `TableOfContents` directive both default to generating heading IDs of the form `toc_1`, `toc_2`, `toc_3`, ... with no input-derived component. An attacker who can place a heading anywhere in the document can predict which `toc_N` ID it will receive, and can inject HTML elsewhere (in a non-heading context) that uses the same `id="toc_N"` to either (a) shadow the legitimate heading anchor, breaking same-page navigation, or (b) collide with CSS or JavaScript that targets `#toc_N` selectors, redirecting click handlers and styling to attacker-chosen content.
**File:** `src/mistune/toc.py` line 36-37 (`heading_id = lambda token, index: "toc_" + str(index + 1)`); `src/mistune/directives/toc.py` line 33 (same default).
**Root cause:** the default `heading_id` callback ignores the heading's text content and uses only the headings's order in the document. Two documents rendered together (or one document with attacker-influenced headings spliced into trusted content) produce overlapping `toc_N` IDs. Because `id` attribute uniqueness is required by HTML, browsers behaviour on duplicate IDs is undefined; `document.getElementById('toc_1')` returns the first match, `getElementsByTagName + querySelector` semantics differ across paths, and CSS rules targeting `#toc_1` apply to whichever element matches first in tree order.
## Affected Code
**File:** `src/mistune/toc.py`, lines 33-39.
```python
def add_toc_hook(md, min_level=1, max_level=3, heading_id=None):
if heading_id is None:
def heading_id(token, index):
return "toc_" + str(index + 1) # <-- BUG: index-only ID, no slug derived from heading text
```
**File:** `src/mistune/directives/toc.py`, lines 32-33.
```python
class TableOfContents(DirectivePlugin):
def __init__(self, min_level=1, max_level=3):
# ...
def generate_heading_id(self, token, index):
return "toc_" + str(index + 1) # <-- BUG: same predictable scheme
```
**Why it's wrong:** the standard markdown-engine convention (used by GitHub-flavoured Markdown, Sphinx, MkDocs, pandoc, every modern markdown renderer in production) is to slugify the heading TEXT for the ID — `<h1 id="introduction">Introduction</h1>` — with a numeric suffix appended only when slug collisions occur. mistune's default punts the slugification entirely and produces purely positional IDs that an attacker can predict in O(1).
The downstream impacts:
- Same-page links with `[click](#toc_1)` go to whichever element with `id="toc_1"` appears first in tree order. If the attacker can land any HTML element with `id="toc_1"` before the real heading (via inline_html with `escape=False`, via the include-directive HTML branch, via attacker-supplied content earlier in the document), navigation is hijacked.
- CSS rules targeting `#toc_1` apply to the wrong element.
- JavaScript bound to `document.getElementById('toc_1')` operates on the wrong element.
- The TOC's own `<a href="#toc_1">` link in the rendered TOC list points to whichever element wins the duplicate-ID race.
## Exploit Chain
1. Application uses mistune with `add_toc_hook(md)` or `TableOfContents` directive enabled (the documented setup for sites with TOC support).
2. Application renders an attacker-supplied document, or splices attacker content into a trusted document. With `escape=False` (or via the include-directive `.html` branch covered by my prior advisory), the attacker can place `<a id="toc_1">...</a>` anywhere in the document.
3. mistune assigns `id="toc_1"` to the first heading. Now there are two elements with `id="toc_1"` in the page.
4. The rendered TOC contains `<a href="#toc_1">First heading</a>`. Clicking it navigates to whichever element with `id="toc_1"` appears first in tree order. If the attacker placed their `<a id="toc_1">` BEFORE the heading, navigation is hijacked.
5. Same-page CSS / JS / aria-described references to `#toc_1` similarly redirect.
## Security Impact
**Severity:** sec-low. Not a direct XSS or RCE; the issue is identifier confusion that enables UI-redirection / navigation-hijack attacks. The realistic attacker capability is "make an internal anchor link go to attacker content instead of the real heading", or "make a CSS selector apply to attacker content", or "break aria/screen-reader associations".
**Attacker capability:** with the ability to plant any HTML element with `id="toc_N"` in the document, hijack `<a href="#toc_N">` navigation and any CSS/JS targeting that ID. With `escape=False`, this is straightforward. With `escape=True`, the attacker needs another vector to land a raw `id` attribute (one of the include-directive branches, a sibling tooling pipeline that lets HTML through, etc.).
**Preconditions:** application uses TOC + the default `heading_id` callback. If the application provides its own `heading_id` (e.g., one based on slugified heading text, with collision suffixes), this finding does not apply.
**Differential:** PoC-verified against [email protected]:
```python
import mistune
from mistune.directives import RSTDirective, TableOfContents
md = mistune.create_markdown(plugins=[RSTDirective([TableOfContents()])])
print(md('''
.. toc::
# Heading 1
# Heading 2
'''))
# Output (note: id="toc_1" / id="toc_2", purely positional):
# <details class="toc" open>
# <summary>Table of Contents</summary>
# <ul>
# <li><a href="#toc_1">Heading 1</a></li>
# <li><a href="#toc_2">Heading 2</a></li>
# </ul>
# </details>
# <h1 id="toc_1">Heading 1</h1>
# <h1 id="toc_2">Heading 2</h1>
```
The patched build (with the suggested fix below) produces text-derived slugs like `id="heading-1"` and `id="heading-2"`, which are tied to content rather than position.
## Suggested Fix
Default to slugifying the heading text:
```diff
--- a/src/mistune/toc.py
+++ b/src/mistune/toc.py
@@ -33,9 +33,18 @@ def add_toc_hook(md, min_level=1, max_level=3, heading_id=None):
if heading_id is None:
+ import re
+ _slug_re = re.compile(r"[^a-z0-9]+")
+ seen = {}
def heading_id(token, index):
- return "toc_" + str(index + 1)
+ text = striptags(md.renderer(md.inline(token["text"], {}), BlockState()))
+ slug = _slug_re.sub("-", text.lower()).strip("-") or "section"
+ n = seen.get(slug, 0)
+ seen[slug] = n + 1
+ return slug if n == 0 else f"{slug}-{n}"
```
Same change applies to `src/mistune/directives/toc.py:33`. Existing applications that have hardcoded `#toc_N` anchors will break; document the migration in the changelog and consider providing an opt-out flag for the legacy behaviour. Add a regression test that asserts heading IDs are slug-derived, not position-derived, and that collisions get a `-N` suffix.
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.
- https://github.com/lepture/mistune/security/advisories/GHSA-2hm2-hc3v-44h9
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-59930
- https://github.com/lepture/mistune/commit/c4093c4742ed0d10d9332fb8edb455869b7b581b
- https://github.com/lepture/mistune
- https://github.com/lepture/mistune/releases/tag/v3.3.0
- https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/mistune/PYSEC-2026-2218.yaml