GHSA-2jhm-w3mp-jcwr
NLTK network URL validation permits SSRF to RFC 6598 shared-address-space hosts
Packages
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
A Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) vulnerability exists in nltk/nltk versions 3.9.4 and the current develop branch. The `nltk.pathsec.validate_network_url()` function, intended to prevent SSRF by rejecting internal network addresses, fails to reject IPs in the RFC 6598 shared address space (`100.64.0.0/10`). This occurs because Python's `ipaddress` module does not classify such addresses as `is_private` or `is_global`, and the current guard only checks `is_private` and a few explicit categories. An attacker who can influence a URL passed to NLTK's network-loading helpers can exploit this vulnerability to make a strict-mode application send requests to shared-address-space hosts, potentially exposing non-public infrastructure reachable from the application host. The impact is limited to SSRF-style confidentiality exposure, with no code execution claimed.
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-12372
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/commit/4a820afa58810cd05049b6c6eae306694d6cfe65
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk
- https://github.com/nltk/nltk/releases/tag/v3.10.0
- https://github.com/pypa/advisory-database/tree/main/vulns/nltk/PYSEC-2026-3955.yaml
- https://huntr.com/bounties/2911b643-571c-42e4-b0c2-9a1fa6f491db