GHSA-3653-68v6-rq57
HAPI FHIR: ReDoS via FHIRPath matches()/replaceMatches() in FHIR Validator HTTP Endpoint
Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Maven | ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.dstu2 | < 6.9.7 | 6.9.7 |
| Maven | ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.dstu2016may | < 6.9.7 | 6.9.7 |
| Maven | ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.dstu3 | < 6.9.7 | 6.9.7 |
| Maven | ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.r4 | < 6.9.7 | 6.9.7 |
| Maven | ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.r4b | < 6.9.7 | 6.9.7 |
| Maven | ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.r5 | < 6.9.7 | 6.9.7 |
| Maven | ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.validation | < 6.9.7 | 6.9.7 |
| Maven | ca.uhn.hapi.fhir:org.hl7.fhir.validation.cli | < 6.9.7 | 6.9.7 |
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
## Summary
All implementations of FHIRPathEngine accept arbitrary FHIRPath expressions and evaluate them without input validation. The FHIRPath functions `matches()`, `matchesFull()`, and `replaceMatches()` pass user-controlled regular expressions directly to Java's `Pattern.compile()` and `String.replaceAll()` without complexity checks or timeouts. An attacker can send a resource containing an evil regex pattern that causes catastrophic backtracking, exhausting system resources, and causing Denial-of-Service.
## Details
The vulnerability exists in regex execution in FHIRPathEngine implementations across multiple code modules. For example the org.hl7.fhir.r5 module:
**Entry point 1 — `FHIRPathEngine.java:5929` (R5 `funcMatches`):**
```java
private List<Base> funcMatches(ExecutionContext context, List<Base> focus, ExpressionNode exp) {
String sw = convertToString(swb); // attacker-controlled regex pattern
// ...
Pattern p = Pattern.compile("(?s)" + sw); // VULNERABLE: no complexity check
Matcher m = p.matcher(st); // no timeout
boolean ok = m.find();
```
**Entry point 2 — `FHIRPathEngine.java:5951` (R5 `funcMatchesFull`):**
```java
Pattern p = Pattern.compile("(?s)" + sw); // VULNERABLE: same pattern
Matcher m = p.matcher(st);
boolean ok = m.matches();
```
**Entry point 3 — `FHIRPathEngine.java:5120` (R5 `funcReplaceMatches`):**
```java
result.add(new StringType(convertToString(focus.get(0))
.replaceAll(regex, repl)).noExtensions()); // VULNERABLE: replaceAll uses Pattern internally
```
The same vulnerabilities exist in the dstu2, dstu2016may, dstu3, r4, and r4b modules, and the FHIRPathEngine is used in the validation module functionality.
**Why this is exploitable:**
- No timeout mechanism covers FHIRPath evaluation — the `ValidationTimeout` class only protects `InstanceValidator` operations, not `evaluateFhirPath()`
- Java's `Pattern.compile()` with a pattern like `(a+)+$` against input `"aaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa!"` causes exponential backtracking (O(2^n) time complexity)
## Impact
- **CPU Exhaustion:** The exponential backtracking in Java's regex engine consumes 100% of a CPU core for the duration of the hang (effectively infinite for sufficiently long input strings) for callers of FHIRPathEngine.
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.