GHSA-36xv-jgw5-4q75

### Impact _What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_ [`SseStream._transform()`](https://github.com/nestjs/nest/blob/dea5279ef8fcb568de158003e4281759a2cd7675/packages/core/router/sse-stream.ts) interpolates `message.type` and `message.id` directly into Server-Sent Events text protocol output without sanitizing newline characters (`\r`, `\n`). Since the SSE protocol treats both `\r` and `\n` as field delimiters and `\n\n` as event boundaries, an attacker who can influence these fields through upstream data sources can inject arbitrary SSE events, spoof event types, and corrupt reconnection state. Spring Framework's own security patch ([6e97587](https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-framework/commit/6e9758700a4946be1dca85ca937ef2603e291301)) validates these same fields (`id`, `event`) for the same reason. Actual impact: - **Event spoofing**: Attacker forges SSE events with arbitrary `event:` types, causing client-side `EventSource.addEventListener()` callbacks to fire for wrong event types. - **Data injection**: Attacker injects arbitrary `data:` payloads, potentially triggering XSS if the client renders SSE data as HTML without sanitization. - **Reconnection corruption**: Attacker injects `id:` fields, corrupting the `Last-Event-ID` header on reconnection, causing the client to miss or replay events. - **Attack precondition**: Requires the developer to map user-influenced data to the `type` or `id` fields of SSE messages. Direct HTTP request input does not reach these fields without developer code bridging the gap. - ### Patches _Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_ Patched in `@nestjs/[email protected]`