GHSA-37gc-85xm-2ww6

## Summary Stored XSS in the OpenClaw Control UI when rendering assistant identity (name/avatar) into an inline `<script>` tag without script-context-safe escaping. A crafted value containing `</script>` could break out of the script tag and execute attacker-controlled JavaScript in the Control UI origin. ## Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected versions: `<= 2026.2.14` - Fixed in: `>= 2026.2.15` (next release; fix is already merged on `main`) ## Details The gateway Control UI HTML response previously injected `assistantName` and `assistantAvatar` directly into an inline `<script>` block using `JSON.stringify(...)`. `JSON.stringify` does not prevent `</script>` from terminating the script element, enabling stored XSS if an operator/admin sets the assistant identity to a malicious string. OpenClaw’s Control UI is intended for local use only (see `SECURITY.md`); this advisory’s CVSS reflects a loopback-only/local-access deployment assumption. ## Impact An attacker with the ability to set assistant identity values (config or agent identity) could cause JavaScript execution for Control UI visitors, enabling token/session theft and privileged actions in the UI. ## Fix - Removed inline script injection and serve bootstrap config from a JSON endpoint. - Added a restrictive Content Security Policy for the Control UI (`script-src 'self'`, no inline scripts). ## Fix Commit(s) - `adc818db4a4b3b8d663e7674ef20436947514e1b` - `3b4096e02e7e335f99f5986ec1bd566e90b14a7e` ## Release Process Note This advisory pre-sets the patched version to the planned next release (`2026.2.15`). Once that version is published to npm, this advisory can be published without further edits. Thanks @Adam55A-code for reporting.