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GHSA-49mj-x8jp-qvfc

OctoPrint is Vulnerable to RCE Attacks via Unsanitized Filename in File Upload

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed) High CVE-2025-58180

Packages

EcosystemPackageAffectedFixed in
PyPI octoprint < 1.11.3 1.11.3

Details

As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).

### Impact OctoPrint versions up until and including 1.11.2 contain a vulnerability that allows an **authenticated** attacker to upload a file under a specially crafted filename that will allow arbitrary command execution if said filename becomes included in a command defined in a system event handler and said event gets triggered. If no event handlers executing system commands with uploaded filenames as parameters have been configured, this vulnerability does not have an impact. ### Patches The vulnerability will be patched in version 1.11.3. ### Workaround Until the patch has been applied, OctoPrint administrators who have event handlers configured that include any kind of filename based placeholders (i.e. `{__filename}`, `{__filepath}`, `{filename}`, `{path}`, etc -- refer to [the events documentation](https://docs.octoprint.org/en/master/events/index.html#placeholders) for a full list) should disable those by setting their `enabled` property to `False` or unchecking the "Enabled" checkbox in the GUI based Event Manager. Alternatively, OctoPrint administrators should set `feature.enforceReallyUniversalFilenames` to `true` in `config.yaml` and restart OctoPrint, then vet the existing uploads and make sure to delete any suspicious looking files (e.g. those that contain a `;` in their name followed by a command). As always, OctoPrint administrators are advised to not expose OctoPrint on hostile networks like the public internet, and to vet who has access to their instance. ### Credits This vulnerability was discovered and responsibly disclosed to OctoPrint by @prabhatverma47.

References

External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.