GHSA-4mf2-f3wh-gvf2
Subdomain checking of whitelisted domains could allow unintended redirects in oauth2-proxy
Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7 | < 7.0.0 | 7.0.0 |
| Go | github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy | <= 3.2.0 | no fix listed |
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
### Impact
_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_
For users that use the whitelist domain feature, a domain that ended in a similar way to the intended domain could have been allowed as a redirect.
For example, if a whitelist domain was configured for `.example.com`, the intention is that subdomains of `example.com` are allowed.
Instead, `example.com` and `badexample.com` could also match.
### Patches
_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_
This is fixed in version 7.0.0 onwards.
### Workarounds
_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_
Disable the whitelist domain feature and run separate OAuth2 Proxy instances for each subdomain.
# Original Issue Posted by @semoac:
Whitelist Domain feature is not working as expected because is not matching a dot to ensure the redirect is a subdomain.
## Expected Behavior
If whitelist domain is set to `.example.com` , then `hack.alienexample.com` should be rejected as a valid redirect.
## Current Behavior
The code is removing the `dot` from `.example.com` and only checking if the redirect string end with `example.com`
## Possible Solution
Here
https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/blob/c377466411f2aee180a732187edb638f2f7e57fb/oauthproxy.go#L661
Include the dot when checking the string:
```
strings.HasSuffix(redirectHostname, "." + domainHostname)
```
## Steps to Reproduce (for bugs)
```
package main
import (
"fmt"
"strings"
)
func validOptionalPort(port string) bool {
if port == "" || port == ":*" {
return true
}
if port[0] != ':' {
return false
}
for _, b := range port[1:] {
if b < '0' || b > '9' {
return false
}
}
return true
}
func splitHostPort(hostport string) (host, port string) {
host = hostport
colon := strings.LastIndexByte(host, ':')
if colon != -1 && validOptionalPort(host[colon:]) {
host, port = host[:colon], host[colon+1:]
}
if strings.HasPrefix(host, "[") && strings.HasSuffix(host, "]") {
host = host[1 : len(host)-1]
}
return
}
func main() {
domain := ".example.com"
domainHostname, _ := splitHostPort(strings.TrimLeft(domain, "."))
redirectHostname := "https://hack.alienexample.com"
if (strings.HasPrefix(domain, ".") && strings.HasSuffix(redirectHostname, domainHostname)) { fmt.Println("This should not have happen.")}
}
```
Users of `github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy` are advised to update to `github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7`
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.
- https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/security/advisories/GHSA-4mf2-f3wh-gvf2
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2021-21291
- https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/commit/780ae4f3c99b579cb2ea9845121caebb6192f725
- https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/releases/tag/v7.0.0
- https://pkg.go.dev/github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7