GHSA-575r-357h-fhch
Snipe-IT vulnerable to cross-company asset maintenance re-parenting via API update
Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Packagist | snipe/snipe-it | < 8.6.2 | 8.6.2 |
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
### Impact
The API endpoint for updating asset maintenance records allows an authorized user to change the asset_id of an existing maintenance record to an asset outside their company scope.
In a Full Multiple Company Support / multi-company deployment, this allows a user from Company A to attach or move a maintenance record onto an asset belonging to Company B. The endpoint appears to authorize access to the existing maintenance record’s asset, but does not re-authorize the newly supplied asset_id before saving the update.
### Affected endpoint
`PATCH /api/v1/maintenances/{maintenance_id}`
Also likely affected:
`PUT /api/v1/maintenances/{maintenance_id}`
### Preconditions
The attacker needs:
- A valid authenticated API token.
- Permission to update asset maintenance records.
- Access to a maintenance record currently attached to an asset in their own company.
The attacker does not need access to the target asset’s company.
### Root cause
In the API maintenance update flow, the application checks access to the current maintenance record / current asset, then accepts attacker-controlled fields including `asset_id`.
The vulnerable behavior is that the new asset_id is not checked against the current user’s company scope before being saved.
### Relevant code path:
`app/Http/Controllers/Api/MaintenancesController.php`
The update method loads the maintenance, checks access to the existing $maintenance->asset, then calls:
```php
$maintenance->fill($request->all());
$maintenance->save();
```
Since `asset_id` is fillable on the maintenance model, the attacker can re-parent the record to another company’s asset.
### Workarounds
_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_
### Security impact
This breaks tenant/company isolation in multi-company deployments. A scoped user can write maintenance records against assets outside their authorized company boundary.
Potential impact includes:
- Cross-company asset history pollution.
- Unauthorized modification of another company’s asset maintenance timeline.
- Incorrect maintenance, cost, audit, and warranty records on victim-company assets.
- Loss of integrity in asset lifecycle records.
This is not intended functionality because the application’s company-scoping model should prevent users from writing records onto inaccessible assets.
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.
- https://github.com/grokability/snipe-it/security/advisories/GHSA-575r-357h-fhch
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-55516
- https://github.com/grokability/snipe-it/commit/905d498ecdb0ee5591231c97bf48435e92044368
- https://github.com/grokability/snipe-it
- https://github.com/grokability/snipe-it/releases/tag/v8.6.2