GHSA-584p-rpvq-35vf

### Summary The `fixCleanTitle()` static method in `objects/category.php` constructs a SQL SELECT query by directly interpolating both `$clean_title` and `$id` into the query string without using prepared statements or parameterized queries. An attacker who can trigger category creation or renaming with a crafted title value can inject arbitrary SQL. ### Details **File:** `objects/category.php` **Vulnerable code:** ```php public static function fixCleanTitle($clean_title, $count, $id, $original_title = "") { global $global; $sql = "SELECT * FROM categories WHERE clean_name = '{$clean_title}' "; if (!empty($id)) { $sql .= " AND id != {$id} "; } $sql .= " LIMIT 1"; $res = sqlDAL::readSql($sql, "", [], true); // ... } ``` Both `$clean_title` (a user-supplied category name after slug conversion) and `$id` (the category ID being edited) are embedded directly into the SQL string. The `$clean_title` value derives from user input through the category save workflow — it is the "clean" URL-slug version of whatever category name the user submits. No escaping or parameterization is applied before the value is placed inside single quotes in the query. ### PoC An authenticated admin creates or renames a category with the title: ``` test' UNION SELECT username,password,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 FROM users-- - ``` After slug conversion (which typically only strips spaces and special characters, leaving SQL metacharacters that survive inside single quotes), the backend executes: ```sql SELECT * FROM categories WHERE clean_name = 'test' UNION SELECT username,password,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 FROM users-- -' LIMIT 1 ``` This returns rows from the `users` table, enabling full credential exfiltration. The `$id` concatenation point is also injectable via a crafted numeric+SQL-suffix value if integer validation is absent. ### Impact - **Type:** SQL Injection (CWE-89) - **Severity:** High - **Authentication required:** Admin-level (category management), though the same pattern may be reachable via lower-privilege paths depending on plugin configuration - **Impact:** Full database read; credentials, private video metadata, user PII accessible via UNION injection - **Fix:** Replace direct interpolation with parameterized queries — use `?` placeholders and pass `$clean_title` and `(int)$id` as bound parameters