GHSA-6cp7-3m3c-5x5c

### Impact Denial of service via memory exhaustion. Affects all callers who streamed compressed responses relying on the chunk size — explicit (`iter_bytes(chunk_size=...)`) or the default — to bound memory. The decoder ignored that bound, so a chunk could be far larger than requested and a single compressed response could overflow memory. ```python import gzip, zapros # Server returns ~1 GiB of zeros gzip-compressed to ~1 MiB, # with header: Content-Encoding: gzip bomb = gzip.compress(b"\0" * 1_000_000_000) # ~1 MiB on the wire with zapros.stream("GET", "https://malicious.example/bomb") as response: # Caller asks for 8 KiB chunks, expecting bounded memory: for chunk in response.iter_bytes(chunk_size=8192): ... # first `chunk` is ~1 GiB, not 8 KiB -> memory exhaustion ``` ### Patches Upgrade to `0.14.0` or later. The decoders now bound the output of each decompression step to the requested `chunk_size`: gzip/deflate via `zlib`'s `max_length` + `unconsumed_tail`, brotli via `output_buffer_limit`, and zstd via a bounded `stream_writer`. Peak memory during streaming decode is now proportional to `chunk_size` for all supported encodings. ### Workarounds For unpatched versions: - Read the still-compressed body with `Response.iter_raw()` / `Response.async_iter_raw()`, which bypass the built-in decoders, and decompress it yourself with an explicit output-size bound (e.g. `zlib`'s `max_length`), aborting once a configured limit is exceeded. - Where feasible, send `Accept-Encoding: identity` to disable response compression so bodies are not decompressed client-side. - Avoid decoding response bodies from untrusted servers.