GHSA-6hf3-mhgc-cm65

## Vulnerability In some shared-agent deployments, OpenClaw session tools (`sessions_list`, `sessions_history`, `sessions_send`) allowed broader session targeting than some operators intended. This is primarily a configuration/visibility-scoping issue in multi-user environments where peers are not equally trusted. In Telegram webhook mode, monitor startup also did not fall back to per-account `webhookSecret` when only the account-level secret was configured. ## Typical Use Case Context Most regular OpenClaw deployments run a single agent, or run in trusted environments. In those setups, practical risk from this issue is generally low. ## Impact - Shared-agent, multi-user, less-trusted environments: session-tool access could expose transcript content across peer sessions. - Single-agent or trusted environments: practical impact is limited. - Telegram webhook mode: account-level secret wiring could be missed unless an explicit monitor webhook secret override was provided. ## Affected Packages / Versions - Package: npm `openclaw` - Affected versions: `<= 2026.2.14` - Patched version: `2026.2.15` (planned next release) ## Remediation - Add and enforce `tools.sessions.visibility` (`self | tree | agent | all`) across session tools, defaulting to `tree`. - Keep sandbox clamping behavior so sandboxed runs can be restricted to spawned/session-tree visibility. - Resolve Telegram webhook secret from account config fallback in monitor webhook startup. ## Fix Commit(s) - `c6c53437f7da033b94a01d492e904974e7bda74c` Thanks @aether-ai-agent for reporting.