GHSA-7m5h-w69j-qggg

## Summary An authenticated publish-service reader can invoke `/api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView` and cause persistent deletion of arbitrary attribute view (`AV`) definition files from the workspace. The route is protected only by generic `CheckAuth`, which accepts publish `RoleReader` requests. The handler forwards a caller-controlled `id` directly into a model function that deletes `data/storage/av/<id>.json` without verifying either: - that the caller is allowed to perform write/destructive actions; or - that the target AV is actually unused. This is a persistent integrity and availability issue reachable from the publish surface. ## Root Cause ### 1. Publish users are issued a `RoleReader` JWT - [kernel/model/auth.go](/root/audit/siyuan/kernel/model/auth.go#L105) ```go ClaimsKeyRole: RoleReader, ``` ### 2. The publish reverse proxy forwards that token upstream - [kernel/server/proxy/publish.go](/root/audit/siyuan/kernel/server/proxy/publish.go#L131) - [kernel/server/proxy/publish.go](/root/audit/siyuan/kernel/server/proxy/publish.go#L186) ### 3. `CheckAuth` accepts `RoleReader` - [kernel/model/session.go](/root/audit/siyuan/kernel/model/session.go#L201) ```go if role := GetGinContextRole(c); IsValidRole(role, []Role{ RoleAdministrator, RoleEditor, RoleReader, }) { c.Next() return } ``` ### 4. The route is exposed with `CheckAuth` only - [kernel/api/router.go](/root/audit/siyuan/kernel/api/router.go#L507) ```go ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView", model.CheckAuth, removeUnusedAttributeView) ``` There is no `CheckAdminRole` and no `CheckReadonly`. ### 5. The handler forwards attacker-controlled `id` directly to the delete sink - [kernel/api/av.go](/root/audit/siyuan/kernel/api/av.go#L32) ```go avID := arg["id"].(string) model.RemoveUnusedAttributeView(avID) ``` ### 6. The model deletes the AV file unconditionally - [kernel/model/attribute_view.go](/root/audit/siyuan/kernel/model/attribute_view.go#L49) ```go func RemoveUnusedAttributeView(id string) { absPath := filepath.Join(util.DataDir, "storage", "av", id+".json") if !filelock.IsExist(absPath) { return } ... if err = filelock.RemoveWithoutFatal(absPath); err != nil { ... return } IncSync() } ``` Crucially, this function does **not** verify that the supplied AV is actually unused. The name of the function suggests a cleanup helper, but the implementation is really "delete AV file by id if it exists". ## Attack Prerequisites - Publish service enabled - Attacker can access the publish service - If publish auth is enabled, attacker has valid publish-reader credentials - Attacker knows an `avID` ## Obtaining `avID` `avID` is not secret. It is exposed extensively in frontend markup as `data-av-id`. Examples: - [app/src/protyle/render/av/render.ts](/root/audit/siyuan/app/src/protyle/render/av/render.ts#L117) - [app/src/protyle/render/av/layout.ts](/root/audit/siyuan/app/src/protyle/render/av/layout.ts#L120) - [app/src/protyle/render/av/groups.ts](/root/audit/siyuan/app/src/protyle/render/av/groups.ts#L52) Any publish-visible database/attribute view can therefore disclose a valid `avID` to the attacker. ## Exploit Path 1. Attacker browses published content containing an attribute view. 2. Attacker extracts the `data-av-id` value from the page/DOM. 3. Attacker sends a POST request to `/api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView` through the publish service. 4. Publish proxy injects a valid `RoleReader` token. 5. `CheckAuth` accepts the request. 6. The handler passes the attacker-controlled `avID` to `model.RemoveUnusedAttributeView`. 7. The backend deletes `data/storage/av/<avID>.json`. ## Proof of Concept Request: ```http POST /api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView HTTP/1.1 Host: <publish-host>:<publish-port> Content-Type: application/json Authorization: Basic <publish-account-creds-if-enabled> { "id": "<exposed-data-av-id>" } ``` Expected result: - HTTP 200 - backend increments sync state - the target attribute view file is removed from `data/storage/av/` - published and local workspace behavior for that AV becomes broken until restored from history or recreated ## Impact This gives a low-privileged publish reader a destructive persistent write primitive against workspace data. Practical consequences include: - deletion of live attribute view definitions - corruption/breakage of published database views - breakage of local workspace rendering and AV-backed relationships - operational disruption until restore or manual repair The bug affects integrity and availability, not merely UI state. ## Recommended Fix At minimum: 1. Block publish/read-only users from this route. 2. Require admin/write authorization. 3. Re-validate that the target AV is actually unused before deletion. Safe router fix: ```go ginServer.Handle("POST", "/api/av/removeUnusedAttributeView", model.CheckAuth, model.CheckAdminRole, model.CheckReadonly, removeUnusedAttributeView, ) ``` And inside the model or handler, reject deletion unless the target `id` is present in `UnusedAttributeViews(...)`.