GHSA-7rv5-mrxv-xcr9
Seroval: Deserialization invokes attacker-chosen callables: AsyncIteratorFactoryInstance calls source.on(listener) without type check
Packages
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
### Summary
When `fromJSON` rebuilt an async iterator, it called `on()` on the iterator's source without checking that the source was a seroval stream. A crafted payload could pick another value as the source, such as a function returned by an application plugin. The deserializer then called that value's `on` method.
This is a variant of GHSA-mv8w-475r-vwqw. That fix covered the promise and stream control nodes but not the async iterator node.
### Impact
An application that passes untrusted input to `fromJSON` with plugins that return callable values can have those callables invoked during deserialization. What this allows depends on what the plugin's values do.
### Affected versions
- Versions up to 1.6.3 accept any value as the source.
- 1.6.4 rejects the reported payload.
- 1.6.5 to 1.6.7 check the source by node type, which a payload can get around by reusing a node id.
- All versions up to 1.6.7 should be treated as affected.
### Patches
Fixed in `[email protected]`. Streams and sequences are now internal class instances. The deserializer checks the source value with `instanceof`, so plain data and plugin values are rejected no matter which node id they use.
### Workarounds
Avoid plugins whose `deserialize` returns functions or objects with an `on` method when decoding untrusted input. Upgrading to 1.6.8 is recommended.
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.
- https://github.com/lxsmnsyc/seroval/security/advisories/GHSA-7rv5-mrxv-xcr9
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-116580
- https://github.com/lxsmnsyc/seroval/commit/3edc78b495ea0d6bd498143e5b3e56996607c5f2
- https://github.com/lxsmnsyc/seroval/commit/50926b3ee198fb757e6ce3aa70efeed38d931c8d
- https://github.com/lxsmnsyc/seroval
- https://github.com/lxsmnsyc/seroval/releases/tag/[email protected]