GHSA-7x63-xv5r-3p2x
OAuth2 Proxy has an Authentication Bypass via X-Forwarded-Uri Header Spoofing
Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/v7 | >= 7.5.0, < 7.15.2 | 7.15.2 |
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
### Impact
A configuration-dependent authentication bypass exists in OAuth2 Proxy.
Deployments are affected when all of the following are true:
* OAuth2 Proxy is configured with `--reverse-proxy`
* and at least one rule is defined with `--skip_auth_routes` or the legacy `--skip-auth-regex`
OAuth2 Proxy may trust a client-supplied `X-Forwarded-Uri` header when `--reverse-proxy` is enabled and `--skip-auth-route` or `--skip-auth-regex` is configured. An attacker can spoof this header so OAuth2 Proxy evaluates authentication and skip-auth rules against a different path than the one actually sent to the upstream application.
This can result in an unauthenticated remote attacker bypassing authentication and accessing protected routes without a valid session.
### Patches
This issue is addressed as part of the newly introduced `--trusted-proxy-ip` flag in `v7.15.2`. If you leave it unset, OAuth2 Proxy will **continue to trust ALL** source IPs (0.0.0.0/0) for backwards compatibility, which means a client may still be able to spoof forwarded headers. Therefore after upgrading we urge you to use the new `--trusted-proxy-ip` flag to set the IPs or CIDR ranges of the reverse proxies that are allowed to send `X-Forwarded-*` headers and furthermore implement the mitigation steps outlined below to properly configure your load balancer infrastructure.
### Mitigation
- Strip any client-provided `X-Forwarded-Uri` header at the reverse proxy or load balancer level
- Explicitly overwrite `X-Forwarded-Uri` with the actual request URI before forwarding requests to OAuth2 Proxy
Example nginx mitigation for the auth subrequest:
```
location /internal-auth/ {
internal; # Ensure external users can't access this path
# Make sure the OAuth2 Proxy knows where the original request came from.
proxy_set_header Host $host;
proxy_set_header X-Real-IP $remote_addr;
# set the value to the actual $request_uri and therefore strip any user provided X-Forwarded-Uri
proxy_set_header X-Forwarded-Uri $request_uri;
proxy_pass http://oauth2-proxy:4180/;
}
```
- Restrict direct client access to OAuth2 Proxy so it can only be reached through a trusted reverse proxy
- Remove or narrow `--skip-auth-route` / `--skip-auth-regex` rules where possible
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.
- https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy/security/advisories/GHSA-7x63-xv5r-3p2x
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-40575
- https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/CVE-2026-40575
- https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2460449
- https://github.com/oauth2-proxy/oauth2-proxy
- https://security.access.redhat.com/data/csaf/v2/vex/2026/cve-2026-40575.json