GHSA-946h-jp5c-8fvh
symfony/ux-autocomplete: Information exposure via unescaped LIKE wildcards in EntitySearchUtil
Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Packagist | symfony/ux-autocomplete | >= 2.2.0, < 2.36.0 | 2.36.0 |
| Packagist | symfony/ux-autocomplete | >= 3.0.0, < 3.1.0 | 3.1.0 |
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
### Description
`Symfony\UX\Autocomplete\Doctrine\EntitySearchUtil::addSearchClause()` builds the `LIKE` expression used by the autocomplete endpoint by wrapping the client-supplied query in `%...%` without escaping the SQL `LIKE` wildcards (`%`, `_`, `\`). The value is passed as a bound parameter, so this is not SQL injection, but a client can send `%` to match every row or use `_` as a single-character wildcard.
Because `searchable_fields` defaults to every property of the entity and the autocomplete endpoint is public by default (`BaseEntityAutocompleteType` ships with `security => false`), an unauthenticated user can turn the endpoint into a broad matcher or a blind boolean oracle against every column of the entity, including columns the application never intended to expose.
### Resolution
`EntitySearchUtil` now escapes `\`, `%`, and `_` in the user-supplied query with `addcslashes()` and appends an explicit `ESCAPE '\'` clause to the generated `LIKE` expression, so those characters are matched literally. The exact-match `words_query` `IN()` branch is unchanged.
The patch for this issue is available [here](https://github.com/symfony/ux/commit/725ab3d40689c91ff19ad2d01940a30007769214) for branch 2.x (and forward-ported to 3.x).
### Credits
Symfony would like to thank Pascal Cescon for reporting the issue and providing the fix.
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.