GHSA-9cg9-4h4f-j6fg
phpMyFAQ has unauthenticated config backup download via /api/setup/backup
Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Packagist | thorsten/phpmyfaq | < 4.0.16 | 4.0.16 |
| Packagist | thorsten/phpmyfaq | >= 4.1.0-alpha, <= 4.1.0-beta.2 | no fix listed |
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
### Summary
An unauthenticated remote attacker can trigger generation of a configuration backup ZIP via `POST /api/setup/backup` and then download the generated ZIP from a web-accessible location. The ZIP contains sensitive configuration files (e.g., `database.php` with database credentials), leading to high-impact information disclosure and potential follow-on compromise.
### Details
The endpoint `/api/setup/backup` is reachable via default rewrite rules and does not enforce authentication/authorization or API token verification. When called with any non-empty body (used as an “installed version” string), the server creates a ZIP archive inside the configuration directory and returns a direct URL to the generated ZIP file.
Relevant code paths:
- Rewrite rule exposing the endpoint:
- `phpmyfaq/.htaccess`: `RewriteRule ^api/setup/(check|backup|update-database) api/index.php [L,QSA]`
- Controller implementation:
- `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Controller/Api/SetupController.php` → `backup()`
- No call to `hasValidToken()`, `userIsAuthenticated()`, or any permission check
- Backup creation:
- `phpmyfaq/src/phpMyFAQ/Setup/Update.php` → `createConfigBackup()`
- Writes the ZIP into the config directory and returns a public URL under `content/core/config/`
### PoC
Replace `BASE_URL` with your instance URL.
1) Trigger config backup generation without authentication:
```bash
BASE_URL="http://localhost"
curl -i -X POST "${BASE_URL}/api/setup/backup" \
-H "Content-Type: text/plain" \
--data "4.1.0-RC"
```
Expected result: `200 OK` with JSON containing `backupFile`.
2) Copy the `backupFile` URL from the JSON response and download it (still without authentication):
```bash
# Example (replace with the exact URL returned in step 1)
curl -i "http://localhost/content/core/config/phpmyfaq-config-backup.YYYY-MM-DD.zip" -o phpmyfaq-config-backup.zip
```
3) Verify sensitive content exists in the ZIP:
```bash
unzip -l phpmyfaq-config-backup.zip
unzip -p phpmyfaq-config-backup.zip database.php
```
Observed: `database.php` is included and contains DB host/user/password.
### Impact
- Vulnerability class: Missing authentication/authorization for a sensitive function + sensitive information exposure.
- Who is impacted: Any internet-exposed phpMyFAQ installation where the default `.htaccess` rewrite rules are active and the endpoint is reachable.
- Security impact: Disclosure of configuration secrets (DB credentials, integration config, etc.), enabling follow-on attacks such as database takeover and data exfiltration.
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.