GHSA-9gmc-jqmh-3rvm

# Copier: trust-prefix bypass via path traversal runs tasks unprompted ### Summary In copier `>= 9.5.0, <= 9.15.1`, the `trust` setting's prefix match (`copier/_settings.py`) compares the template URL against a trusted prefix with a raw `str.startswith` and **no path normalization**, while the URL *is* normalized when the template is actually fetched (`Path.resolve()` for local paths; libcurl dot-segment removal for `https`). A template reference that textually starts with a trusted prefix but contains `..` (e.g. `https://github.com/trusted-org/../attacker-org/repo.git`) is therefore granted trust yet resolves to a different, attacker-controlled template, whose `tasks` / `migrations` / `jinja_extensions` then run **without the `--trust` prompt** — arbitrary command execution. Likely **CWE-22 (Improper Limitation of a Pathname)** in the trust check leading to **CWE-94 (code execution)**. ### Details `trust` lets users mark template locations as trusted so copier skips the unsafe-feature gate. A trailing `/` makes an entry a **prefix** match (`docs/settings.md`: *"Locations ending with `/` will be matched as prefixes, trusting all templates from that location"*). `copier/_settings.py:141-146` (tag `v9.15.1`): ```python return any( repository.startswith(_normalize(t)) if t.endswith("/") else repository == _normalize(t) for t in trust ) ``` `_normalize` only expands `~`; it does **not** touch `..` or collapse segments — `copier/_settings.py:149-152` (tag `v9.15.1`): ```python def _normalize(url: str) -> str: if url.startswith("~"): # Only expand on str to avoid messing with URLs url = expanduser(url) # noqa: PTH111 return url ``` This decision gates code execution — `copier/_main.py:293` (tag `v9.15.1`): ```python if self.unsafe or is_trusted_repository(self.settings.trust, self.template.url): return # skip the unsafe-feature check entirely ``` The chain: the trust comparison sees the **raw** URL, so `"https://github.com/safeorg/../evilorg/t.git".startswith("https://github.com/safeorg/")` is `True`; but the value copier hands to `git`/`pathlib` is **normalized**, so the template actually loaded is `evilorg/t` (a different, attacker-owned org). Trust is granted to a location the user never trusted, and `_check_unsafe` returns early, so the malicious template's tasks execute with no prompt. This is most acute on `copier update`, which reads `_src_path` from the project's `.copier-answers.yml` (`copier/_subproject.py`) — i.e. an attacker who hands you a project controls the URL that the trust check is applied to. In-repo asymmetry that confirms the omission: copier consistently resolves paths *everywhere else* it makes a security decision — `Path.resolve()` plus `is_relative_to(...)` guards in `_render_template`, `template_copy_root`, and `_external_data` — but not in the trust comparison. ### PoC Self-contained standalone script; runs against a clean, pinned PyPI install via the real `copier` CLI only. **Static by default** (`copier copy --pretend` reaches the trust decision but does not execute tasks); `--prove-exec` is an opt-in supplementary run that fires an inert marker (`echo` + `touch`). The full `poc.py` accompanies this report. Build and run: ```bash python -m venv venv && . venv/bin/activate pip install "copier==9.15.1" python poc.py # static proof (default) python poc.py --prove-exec # also fire the inert marker ``` Observed output (`copier 9.15.1`): ``` == version proof == copier == 9.15.1 module : .../site-packages/copier/__init__.py == inputs == trusted prefix (settings.yml): /tmp/copier_trust_poc_XXXX/trusted_templates/ control src (canonical) : /tmp/copier_trust_poc_XXXX/attacker/evil_template exploit src (traversal) : /tmp/copier_trust_poc_XXXX/trusted_templates/../attacker/evil_template both resolve to the SAME dir : True exploit startswith trusted/ : True minimal delta : exploit = '/tmp/copier_trust_poc_XXXX/trusted_templates/..' + '/attacker/evil_template' == static proof (copier copy --pretend; payload NOT executed) == control (canonical, untrusted): exit=4 -> BLOCKED (UnsafeTemplateError) exploit (trusted-prefix /..) : exit=0 -> TRUSTED, task reached marker on disk after --pretend: False (expected False: --pretend does not run tasks) --- copier's own output for the exploit (note the task it WOULD run) --- | Copying from template version None | create hello.txt | > Running task 1 of 1: echo COPIER-TRUST-BYPASS-RCE-MARKER && touch COPIER_RCE_PROOF == VERDICT == BYPASS CONFIRMED: identical template is refused by canonical path (exit 4) yet granted trust via '<trusted>/..' traversal (exit 0), so its tasks run with no --trust prompt. == --prove-exec: running the exploit for real (inert marker) == | COPIER-TRUST-BYPASS-RCE-MARKER | > Running task 1 of 1: echo COPIER-TRUST-BYPASS-RCE-MARKER && touch COPIER_RCE_PROOF exit=0 marker file 'COPIER_RCE_PROOF' created: True -> ARBITRARY COMMAND EXECUTED via a 'trusted' template, no --trust ``` The exploit is the same template as the control plus the minimal delta `<trusted_prefix>/..`. Deterministic: same input → same result. The PoC uses a local trusted prefix for a self-contained, network-free run; the `https` case is identical because git normalizes `..` before the request — e.g. `git ls-remote "https://github.com/copier-org/../pallets/flask.git"` emits `warning: redirecting to https://github.com/pallets/flask.git/` and returns `pallets/flask`'s refs, a different org than the trusted `copier-org/`. ### Impact A user who has configured a trusted **prefix** (a trailing-`/` entry in `trust`, a documented feature) no longer gets the unsafe-feature prompt for a template that merely *appears* to live under that prefix. Any party who can influence the template URL — most realistically the author of a project the victim runs `copier update` on, since `_src_path` comes from that project's `.copier-answers.yml` — can host the real template under a different org/location reached via `..` and have its `tasks`/`migrations`/ `jinja_extensions` execute arbitrary commands with no prompt. It fires on a default, modern git for both local paths and `https`. Proposed severity: **High**, comparable to the project's prior unsafe-template advisory (GHSA-3xw7-v6cj-5q8h). Proposed CVSS v4 vector (maintainer to finalize; `AT:P` reflects the required trusted-prefix configuration): `CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:P/PR:N/UI:P/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H`. Conservative variant if you scope impact to the user account only (no host escape claim): drop `SC/SI/SA` to `N`. ### Recommended fix Normalize **both** sides before comparing, instead of raw `startswith`. For local entries, compare resolved absolute paths (`Path(t).resolve()` vs `Path(repository).resolve()`) using segment containment / `is_relative_to`, the pattern already used in `_render_template` and `template_copy_root`. For URL entries, parse the URL and reject or collapse `..`/`.`/empty path segments before the prefix test. As defense-in-depth, reject any `_src_path` read from an answers file that contains `..` segments after the scheme/host, since legitimate template URLs never need them. ### References - CWE-22 — https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/22.html - CWE-94 — https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/94.html - Affected source (tag `v9.15.1`): `copier/_settings.py:141-146` (prefix match), `copier/_settings.py:149-152` (`_normalize`), `copier/_main.py:293` (trust gate). - Documented prefix behavior: `docs/settings.md` ("Locations ending with `/` will be matched as prefixes"). - `https` `..` normalization: libcurl removes dot segments by default (`CURLOPT_PATH_AS_IS` defaults to off) — https://curl.se/libcurl/c/CURLOPT_PATH_AS_IS.html - Novelty: distinct from copier's published advisories, which concern filesystem read/write traversal in rendered output; this is an authorization bypass in the `trust` setting's URL matching. The flawed match is identical between released `v9.15.1` and current `master` HEAD, and unchanged since the trust-prefix feature was introduced in `v9.5.0` (originally `copier/settings.py`, commit `71358ed`; renamed to `copier/_settings.py` in the v9.12.0 refactor).