GHSA-9w78-79q7-r4fp
n8n: Authenticated SSRF via Dynamic Node Parameters Endpoints Allows Internal Network Access
Packages
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
## Impact
Endpoints in `/rest/dynamic-node-parameters/` lacked authorization scopes, making it reachable by any authenticated user with no workflow creation or execution required.
By supplying an absolute URL in the routing configuration, a caller could override the node type's declared baseURL, defeating the restriction meant to confine requests to the node's own upstream service. With SSRF protection disabled by default (`N8N_SSRF_PROTECTION_ENABLED=false`), this let an authenticated user make the n8n server issue HTTP requests to arbitrary internal targets.
## Patches
The issue has been fixed in n8n versions 1.123.64, 2.29.8, and 2.30.1. Users should upgrade to this version or later to remediate the vulnerability.
## Workarounds
If upgrading is not immediately possible, administrators should consider the following temporary mitigations:
- Restrict n8n instance access to fully trusted users only.
- Set `N8N_SSRF_PROTECTION_ENABLED=true` to enable SSRF filtering for private IP ranges and cloud metadata endpoints.
- Restrict network egress from the n8n host to limit reachable internal services.
These workarounds do not fully remediate the risk and should only be used as short-term mitigation measures.
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.
- https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/security/advisories/GHSA-9w78-79q7-r4fp
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-65593
- https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n
- https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/releases/tag/[email protected]
- https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/releases/tag/[email protected]
- https://github.com/n8n-io/n8n/releases/tag/[email protected]
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/n8n-before-ssrf-via-dynamic-node-parameters