GHSA-c6rr-7pmc-73wc

ENS DNSSEC Oracle Vulnerable to RSA Signature Forgery via Missing PKCS#1 v1.5 Padding Validation

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed) Low CVE-2026-22866

Packages

Ecosystem	Package	Affected	Fixed in
npm	@ensdomains/ens-contracts	<= 1.6.2	no fix listed

Details

As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).

### Impact The `RSASHA256Algorithm` and `RSASHA1Algorithm` contracts fail to validate PKCS#1 v1.5 padding structure when verifying RSA signatures. The contracts only check if the last 32 (or 20) bytes of the decrypted signature match the expected hash. This enables Bleichenbacher's 2006 signature forgery attack against DNS zones using RSA keys with low public exponents (e=3). Two ENS-supported TLDs (.cc and .name) use e=3 for their Key Signing Keys, allowing any domain under these TLDs to be fraudulently claimed on ENS without DNS ownership. Affected contracts Contract | Address | Status -- | -- | -- RSASHA256Algorithm | 0x9D1B5a639597f558bC37Cf81813724076c5C1e96 | Vulnerable RSASHA1Algorithm | 0x6ca8624Bc207F043D140125486De0f7E624e37A1 | Vulnerable DNSSECImpl | 0x0fc3152971714E5ed7723FAFa650F86A4BaF30C5 | Uses vulnerable algorithms DNSRegistrar | 0xB32cB5677a7C971689228EC835800432B339bA2B | Attack entry point ### Patches The bug was reported via Immunefi with possible solutions. The patch was merged at https://github.com/ensdomains/ens-contracts/commit/c76c5ad0dc9de1c966443bd946fafc6351f87587 ### Workarounds - Deploy the patched contracts - Point DNSSECImpl.setAlgorithm to the deployed contract ### Resources https://github.com/ensdomains/ens-contracts-bug-62248-pr-509

References

External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.