GHSA-cv27-6wvh-8x7j
ApostropheCMS: Incomplete CVE-2026-53606: `meta http-equiv=refresh` `content` still ships `javascript:` / `data:` URLs
Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | sanitize-html | < 2.18.0 | 2.18.0 |
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
### Summary
CVE-2026-53606 expanded `allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes` so named URL attributes (`action`, `formaction`, `data`, `poster`, `background`, later `ping`, `xlink:href`, …) go through `naughtyHref()`. A **URL nested inside `meta` `content`** (`http-equiv=refresh`) is not an attribute name on that list, so the embedded destination is never scheme-checked.
Default `allowedTags` still omit `meta`. Same non-default integrator config as 53606: allow `meta` plus `http-equiv` / `content`.
On **2.17.7**:
```text
sanitizeHtml(
'<meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=javascript:alert(1)">',
{ allowedTags: ['meta'], allowedAttributes: { meta: ['http-equiv', 'content'] } }
)
// => <meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0;url=javascript:alert(1)" />
```
`data:text/html,…` and arbitrary `https:` destinations also survive. `formaction="javascript:…"` (53606) is stripped.
Please **Request CVE**. Credit: Finder + Reporter (`adrbogacz`).
### Details
`naughtyHref()` only runs when the attribute name is in `allowedSchemesAppliedToAttributes` (`index.js` ~385). Refresh URLs live in a `content` value of the form `0;url=…`, so the gate never fires. Adding `content` to that list wholesale would break ordinary meta `content` (description, viewport).
**Fix:** when `http-equiv` is `refresh` (case-insensitive), parse the `; url=` destination and run `naughtyHref('meta', url)`. Drop `content` (or the tag) if the URL is rejected. Leave other `meta` `content` values alone.
### PoC
Local `[email protected]`. Output inspection only:
```text
node -e '
const sanitize = require("sanitize-html");
const opts = { allowedTags: ["meta"], allowedAttributes: { meta: ["http-equiv", "content"] } };
for (const html of [
"<meta http-equiv=\"refresh\" content=\"0;url=javascript:alert(1)\">",
"<meta http-equiv=\"refresh\" content=\"0;url=data:text/html,aaa\">",
"<form><button formaction=\"javascript:alert(1)\">x</button></form>",
]) {
console.log(html, "=>", sanitize(html, html.includes("meta") ? opts : { allowedTags: ["form","button"], allowedAttributes: { button: ["formaction"] } }));
}
'
```
Expected: refresh `javascript:` / `data:` remain; 53606 `formaction` is removed. Do not attach a browser hang or stored-XSS page.
### Impact
An integrator who allowed `meta` + `content` expecting `allowedSchemes` to apply (the 53606 configuration pattern) still emits a refresh to `javascript:`, `data:`, or an attacker `https:` URL. Stored XSS / open redirect for viewers of that HTML. Default config is not affected.
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.
- https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/security/advisories/GHSA-cv27-6wvh-8x7j
- https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/9500b8b0e1d630d5e07fbb5fd2c25ed0943845ce
- https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/commit/f84fd41cbf6c22eb8d0008fc9c25df1f7130b350
- https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe
- https://github.com/apostrophecms/apostrophe/releases/tag/[email protected]