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GHSA-f5c8-m5vw-rmgq

nova-toggle-5: Improper authorization on toggle endpoint allowed non-Nova users to modify boolean fields

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed) Moderate CVE-2026-42202

Packages

EcosystemPackageAffectedFixed in
Packagist almirhodzic/nova-toggle-5 < 1.3.0 1.3.0

Details

As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).

### Impact In versions `< 1.3.0`, the toggle endpoint (`POST /nova-vendor/nova-toggle/toggle/{resource}/{resourceId}`) was protected only by `web` + `auth:<guard>` middleware. Any user authenticated on the configured guard could call the endpoint and flip boolean attributes on any Nova resource — including users who do not have access to Nova itself (for example, frontend customers sharing the `web` guard with the Nova admin area). The endpoint also accepted an arbitrary `attribute` parameter, which meant a valid caller could toggle any boolean column on the underlying model — not just columns exposed as `Toggle` fields on the resource. ### Patches Fixed in `1.3.0`: - The route is now protected by Nova's `nova:api` middleware, which enforces the `viewNova` gate. - The controller now checks the resource's `authorizedToUpdate` policy. - The controller only accepts attributes that are declared as a `Toggle` field on the resource and are not readonly in the current request context. ### Workarounds Users who cannot upgrade immediately can either remove the package or restrict access to the `/nova-vendor/nova-toggle/toggle/*` routes via an additional middleware in their application that enforces the `viewNova` gate. ### Credits nova-toggle-5 thanks [Roberto Negro](https://github.com/RobertoNegro) for the responsible disclosure.

References

External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.