GHSA-fvmw-cj7j-j39q

**Summary** A Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) vulnerability exists in Astro when using the **@astrojs/cloudflare** adapter with `output: 'server'`. The built-in image optimization endpoint (`/_image`) uses `isRemoteAllowed()` from Astro’s internal helpers, which **unconditionally allows `data:` URLs**. When the endpoint receives a valid `data:` URL pointing to a malicious SVG containing JavaScript, and the Cloudflare-specific implementation performs a **302 redirect back to the original `data:` URL**, the browser directly executes the embedded JavaScript. This completely bypasses any domain allow-listing (`image.domains` / `image.remotePatterns`) and typical Content Security Policy mitigations. **Affected Versions** - `@astrojs/cloudflare` ≤ 12.6.10 (and likely all previous versions) - Astro ≥ 4.x when used with `output: 'server'` and the Cloudflare adapter **Root Cause – Vulnerable Code** File: `node_modules/@astrojs/internal-helpers/src/remote.ts` ```ts export function isRemoteAllowed(src: string, ...): boolean { if (!URL.canParse(src)) { return false; } const url = new URL(src); // Data URLs are always allowed if (url.protocol === 'data:') { return true; } // Non-http(s) protocols are never allowed if (!['http:', 'https:'].includes(url.protocol)) { return false; } // ... further http/https allow-list checks } ``` In the **Cloudflare adapter**, the `/_image` endpoint contains logic similar to: ```ts const href = ctx.url.searchParams.get('href'); if (!href) { // return error } if (isRemotePath(href)) { if (isRemoteAllowed(href, imageConfig) === false) { // return error } else { //redirect to return the image return Response.redirect(href, 302); } } ``` Because `data:` URLs are considered “allowed”, a request such as: `https://example.com/_image?href=... (base64-encoded malicious SVG)` triggers a **302 redirect directly to the `data:` URL**, causing the browser to render and execute the malicious JavaScript inside the SVG. **Proof of Concept (PoC)** 1. Create a minimal Astro project with Cloudflare adapter (`output: 'server'`). 2. Deploy to Cloudflare Pages or Workers. 3. Request the image endpoint with the following payload: ``` https://yoursite.com/_image?href= ``` (Base64 decodes to: `<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg"><script>alert('zomasec')</script></svg>`) 4. The endpoint returns a **302 redirect** to the `data:` URL → browser executes the `<script>` → `alert()` fires. **Impact** - Reflected/Strored XSS (depending on application usage) - Session hijacking (access to cookies, localStorage, etc.) - Account takeover when combined with CSRF - Data exfiltration to attacker-controlled servers - Bypasses `image.domains` / `image.remotePatterns` configuration entirely **Safe vs Vulnerable Behavior** Other Astro adapters (Node, Vercel, etc.) typically **proxy and rasterize** SVGs, stripping JavaScript. The **Cloudflare adapter** currently **redirects** to remote resources (including `data:` URLs), making it uniquely vulnerable. **References** - Vulnerable function: https://github.com/withastro/astro/blob/main/packages/internal-helpers/src/remote.ts - Similar `data:` URL bypass in WordPress: [CVE-2025-2575 ](https://feedly.com/cve/CVE-2025-2575)