GHSA-gm3x-23wp-hc2c
Path Normalization Bypass in Traefik Router + Middleware Rules
Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/traefik/traefik | <= 1.7.34 | no fix listed |
| Go | github.com/traefik/traefik/v2 | < 2.11.32 | 2.11.32 |
| Go | github.com/traefik/traefik/v3 | < 3.6.3 | 3.6.3 |
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
## Impact
There is a potential vulnerability in Traefik managing the requests using a `PathPrefix`, `Path` or `PathRegex` matcher.
When Traefik is configured to route the requests to a backend using a matcher based on the path; if the request path contains an encoded restricted character from the following set **('/', '\', 'Null', ';', '?', '#')**, it’s possible to target a backend, exposed using another router, by-passing the middlewares chain.
## Example
```yaml
apiVersion: traefik.io/v1alpha1
kind: IngressRoute
metadata:
name: my-service
spec:
routes:
- match: PathPrefix(‘/admin/’)
kind: Rule
services:
- name: service-a
port: 8080
middlewares:
- name: my-security-middleware
- match: PathPrefix(‘/’)
kind: Rule
services:
- name: service-a
port: 8080
```
In such a case, the request `http://mydomain.example.com/admin%2F` will reach the backend `service-a` without operating the middleware `my-security-middleware` and passing the security put in place for the `/admin/` path.
## Patches
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v2.11.32
- https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.6.4
## For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please [open an issue](https://github.com/traefik/traefik/issues).
<details>
<summary>Original Description</summary>### Summary
A vulnerability exists in Traefik’s path matching logic that allows attackers to bypass access-control middleware (e.g., blocking rules) by using URL-encoded paths. I found this vulnerability while playing PwnSec CTF 2025 with my team @0xL4ugh
### Details
Traefik evaluates router rules before decoding or normalizing the request path, but forwards the request after decoding to the backend service. As a result, routes meant to block access to sensitive endpoints (such as internal, beta, or admin endpoints) can be trivially bypassed.
### PoC
Traefik configuration used in this issue :
```[http.routers.flask-router-report-deny]
entryPoints = ["web"]
rule = "PathPrefix(`/report_note`)"
priority = 10
middlewares = ["block-access"]
service = "flask-service"
[http.middlewares.block-access.replacePathRegex]
regex = ".*"
replacement = "/blocked"
```
The intention is to block all access to /report_note.
However, the following request bypasses the block:
```
POST /%2freport_note HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:62814
```
### Impact
Access Control Bypass:
Any endpoint intended to be blocked (e.g., admin/debug/beta APIs) can be accessed by URL-encoding slashes or other characters.
This could lead to:
- Unauthorized access to restricted endpoints
- Execution of protected internal functionality
- Potential privilege escalation
- Bypass of security policies enforced via Traefik routing rules
</details>
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.