GHSA-hqxq-hwqf-wg83

### Summary A transaction integrity flaw allows an authenticated tenant user to soft-delete synced non-manual transactions through the transaction update endpoint, despite the application explicitly blocking deletion of those transactions via the normal `DELETE` path. This bypass undermines the intended protection for imported transaction records and allows protected transactions to be hidden from normal views. ### Details The issue affects the transaction update path for synced transactions associated with non-manual links. The intended policy is clearly enforced in the `DELETE` handler: deletion of synced transactions for non-manual links is rejected with an error indicating that such transactions cannot be deleted. However, the `PUT` update path still accepts a client-controlled full `Transaction` object and persists fields that should be server-managed, including `deletedAt`. The update logic appears to restrict only selected fields, which leaves `deletedAt` attacker-controllable. Verified behavior on the same synced transaction showed: - `DELETE` was denied with the expected protection error for non-manual links - `PUT` with a user-supplied `deletedAt` value succeeded and returned `200 OK` - a subsequent transaction list no longer showed the transaction - `GET` by transaction ID still returned the record with `deletedAt` populated This demonstrates a policy bypass: although the server explicitly defines synced transactions on non-manual links as non-deletable through the dedicated delete route, the same outcome can still be achieved through the update route by setting the soft-delete field directly. The vulnerability is therefore not a simple UI inconsistency. It is a server-side authorization and integrity flaw caused by trusting a client-supplied full transaction object and failing to protect sensitive server-managed fields from modification. ### PoC The issue can be reproduced by identifying a synced transaction on a non-manual link, confirming that the normal `DELETE` route rejects deletion, then submitting an update request that sets the transaction’s `deletedAt` field. The transaction will then disappear from normal listing views even though direct retrieval still shows the record as soft-deleted. ### Impact - **Type:** Authorization bypass / integrity violation - **Who is impacted:** Authenticated tenant users and any deployment relying on synced transaction immutability for non-manual links - **Security impact:** Attackers can hide or effectively delete protected imported transactions that should not be deletable, compromising transaction history, bookkeeping integrity, and trust in audit-relevant server-managed fields - **Attack preconditions:** The attacker must be authenticated and able to access a synced transaction within their own tenant/account scope