GHSA-j8g6-5gqc-mq36

### Impact `MySQLSelectTool` is intended to be a read-only SQL tool (e.g., for LLM agent querying). However, validation based on the first keyword (e.g., `SELECT`) and a forbidden-keyword list does not block file-writing constructs such as `INTO OUTFILE` / `INTO DUMPFILE`. As a result, an attacker who can influence the tool input (e.g., prompt injection through a public agent endpoint) may be able to write arbitrary content to files on the DB server. If the MySQL/MariaDB account has the `FILE` privilege and server configuration permits writes to a useful location (e.g., a web-accessible directory), the impact can escalate to remote code execution on the application host (for example, by writing a PHP web shell). **Who is impacted:** Deployments that expose an agent using `MySQLSelectTool` to untrusted input and run with overly-permissive DB privileges/configuration. ### Patches **Not patched in:** 2.8.11 **Fixed in:** 2.8.12 Recommended fix direction: - Explicitly reject queries containing: `INTO`, `OUTFILE`, `DUMPFILE`, `LOAD_FILE`, and other file/IO-related functions/clauses. - Prefer AST-based validation (SQL parser) over keyword checks. - Constrain allowed tables/columns and disallow multi-statements. ### Workarounds If you cannot upgrade immediately: - Remove/disable `MySQLSelectTool` for any agent reachable from untrusted input. - Ensure DB account used by the tool **does not** have `FILE` privilege. - Ensure `secure_file_priv` is set to a directory that is **not** web-accessible (or restrict it tightly). - Add a defensive query filter at the application layer rejecting `INTO OUTFILE`, `INTO DUMPFILE`, `LOAD_FILE`, `;` (multi-statements), and suspicious comment patterns.