GHSA-jmmg-jqc7-5qf4

This issue is a browser-origin WebSocket auth chain on local loopback deployments using password auth. It is serious, but conditional: an attacker must get the user to open a malicious page and then successfully guess the gateway password. ## Context and Preconditions OpenClaw’s web/gateway surface is designed for local use and trusted-operator workflows. In affected versions, a browser-origin client could combine three behaviors: - Origin checks not enforced for some non-Control-UI WebSocket client IDs. - Loopback auth attempts exempt from password-failure throttling. - Silent local pairing path available to browser-origin non-Control-UI clients. Successful exploitation requires all of the following: - Gateway reachable on loopback (default). - Password auth mode in use. - Victim opens attacker-controlled web content. - Password is guessable within feasible brute-force/dictionary attempts. ## Practical Impact If the password is guessed, an attacker can establish an authenticated operator WebSocket session and invoke control-plane methods available to that role. This is not an unauthenticated internet-exposed RCE class issue by itself; it is a local browser-origin auth-hardening gap with meaningful impact under the conditions above. ## Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected versions: `<=2026.2.24` (latest published npm version as of February 26, 2026) - Patched versions : `>=2026.2.25` ## Fix Commit(s) - `c736f11a16d6bc27ea62a0fe40fffae4cb071fdb` ## Fix Details - Enforce browser-origin checks for direct browser WebSocket clients beyond Control UI/Webchat (trusted-proxy forwarded flows remain supported). - Apply browser-origin auth failure throttling with loopback exemption disabled. - Block silent auto-pairing for non-Control-UI browser-origin clients. ## Release Process Note `patched_versions` is pre-set to the planned next npm release (`2026.2.25`) so once that release is published, the advisory is published. OpenClaw thanks @luz-oasis for reporting.