GHSA-mr34-9552-qr95

## Summary Webchat tool-result media normalization could pass local and UNC-style file paths into the host-side media embedding path without applying the configured local-root containment policy. ## Impact A crafted tool-result media reference could cause the host to attempt local file reads or Windows UNC/network path access while preparing webchat media blocks. This could disclose allowed host files or trigger network credential exposure on affected Windows deployments. Severity remains medium because exploitation depends on a tool-result media path reaching the webchat embedding path, but the sink is a host-side file read before the user sees the rendered result. ## Affected versions - Affected: `>= 2026.4.7, < 2026.4.15` - Patched: `2026.4.15` ## Fix OpenClaw `2026.4.15` hardens the webchat media path and the shared media resolver. Remote-host `file://` URLs and Windows network paths are rejected before filesystem access, and audio embedding now enforces configured `localRoots` containment before `stat` or read operations. Verified in `v2026.4.15`: - `src/gateway/server-methods/chat-webchat-media.ts` uses safe file-URL parsing, rejects Windows network paths, and calls `assertLocalMediaAllowed` before probing local audio files. - `src/media/web-media.ts` rejects remote-host `file://` URLs, Windows network paths, and local-root bypasses on the shared media path. - `src/gateway/server-methods/chat-webchat-media.test.ts` covers both remote-host `file://` rejection and local-root denial before filesystem access. Fix commits included in `v2026.4.15` and absent from `v2026.4.14`: - `1470de5d3e0970856d86cd99336bb8ada3fe87da` via PR #67293 - `6e58f1f9f54bca1fea1268ec0ee4c01a2af03dde` via PR #67298 - `52ef42302ead9e183e6c8810e0a04ee4ef8ae9fc` via PR #67303 as defense-in-depth for trusted media passthrough anchoring Thanks to @Kherrisan for reporting this issue.