GHSA-p4wh-cr8m-gm6c

### Summary `shell-env` fallback trusted prefix-based executable paths for `$SHELL`, allowing execution of attacker-controlled binaries in local/runtime-env influence scenarios. ### Details In affected versions, shell selection accepted either: 1. a shell listed in `/etc/shells`, or 2. any executable under hardcoded trusted prefixes (`/bin`, `/usr/bin`, `/usr/local/bin`, `/opt/homebrew/bin`, `/run/current-system/sw/bin`). The selected shell was then executed as a login shell (`-l -c 'env -0'`) for PATH/environment probing. On systems where a trusted-prefix directory is writable (for example common Homebrew layouts under `/opt/homebrew/bin`) and runtime `$SHELL` can be influenced, this enabled attacker-controlled binary execution in OpenClaw process context. The fix removes the trusted-prefix executable fallback and now trusts only shells explicitly registered in `/etc/shells`; otherwise it falls back to `/bin/sh`. ### Affected Packages / Versions - Package: `openclaw` (npm) - Affected versions: `>= 2026.2.22, <= 2026.2.22-2` - Latest published vulnerable version: `2026.2.22-2` - Patched versions (released): `>= 2026.2.23` ### Fix Commit(s) - `ff10fe8b91670044a6bb0cd85deb736a0ec8fb55` ### Release Process Note This advisory sets `patched_versions` to the released version (`2026.2.23`). This advisory now reflects released fix version `2026.2.23`. OpenClaw thanks @tdjackey for reporting.