GHSA-p52g-cm5j-mjv4
openssl-src subject to Timing Oracle in RSA Decryption
Packages
| Ecosystem | Package | Affected | Fixed in |
|---|---|---|---|
| crates.io | openssl-src | < 111.25.0 | 111.25.0 |
| crates.io | openssl-src | >= 300.0.0, < 300.0.12 | 300.0.12 |
Details
As written in the advisory (Markdown source, shown as plain text).
A timing based side channel exists in the OpenSSL RSA Decryption implementation which could be sufficient to recover a plaintext across a network in a Bleichenbacher style attack. To achieve a successful decryption an attacker would have to be able to send a very large number of trial messages for decryption. The vulnerability affects all RSA padding modes: PKCS#1 v1.5, RSA-OEAP and RSASVE.
For example, in a TLS connection, RSA is commonly used by a client to send an encrypted pre-master secret to the server. An attacker that had observed a genuine connection between a client and a server could use this flaw to send trial messages to the server and record the time taken to process them. After a sufficiently large number of messages the attacker could recover the pre-master secret used for the original connection and thus be able to decrypt the application data sent over that connection.
References
External links from the advisory. They lead to third-party sites.