GHSA-p9h3-gvpq-5539

### Impact A user with the "customfields.create" permission can store HTML/JS in a Custom Field name, which is later rendered as an asset-list column title WITHOUT escaping at app/Presenters/AssetPresenter.php line 364 ('title' => $field->name) and injected into the table header by the bundled bootstrap-table plugin. It executes for anyone who opens an asset list (e.g. /hardware), including superusers, on page load with no interaction. Since "customfields.create" can be granted to non-superusers, a lower-privileged user gets script execution in a superuser's session -> privilege escalation. STEPS TO REPRODUCE 1. As a user with "customfields.create", create a Custom Field named: `<img src=x onerror=alert(1)>` 2. Add the field to a fieldset that is associated with an asset model. 3. Open `/hardware` -> the payload executes on load. DEMONSTRATED IMPACT An account holding ONLY "customfields.create" (HTTP 403 on /users) planted a payload that, when a superuser opened /hardware, issued an authenticated request in that session and granted the attacker's own account the "superuser" permission (afterwards: GET /users = 200, isSuperUser() = true). ROOT CAUSE - Blade {{ }} encodes the data-columns attribute, but the browser decodes it back before bootstrap-table reads the title; bootstrap-table then renders the header title unescaped because its table-level "escape" option defaults to false and is never enabled. (The per-column 'escape' => true covers cell values, not the header title.) ### Patches Patched in https://github.com/grokability/snipe-it/commit/58754e4e3b86b58a0c4523012ef04a2ae990d2c8